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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Iowa property tax has often been considered a 
hinderance to efficient resource allocation in the agricul -
tural sector. The purpose of thi& study is to consider the 
effect of the property tax upon farm enterprise selection in 
Iowa . 
In chapter two we will review the history and trends 
of the Iowa property tax. Empha&is will be upon its relative 
importance in the total tax structure beginning from its 
inception in 1838 until the present time . 
In the t hird ~hapter an attempt is made to determine the 
extent to which the property tax is capable of being shifted . 
A theoretical discussion of the effect of the variation in 
risk and the concept of tax capitalization is also included . 
The fourth chapter enumerates the variables that appear 
to be important 1n directing farm enterprise selection. The 
first part of this chapter is concerned primarily with those 
variables to be used in the emperical tests . The last part 
contains an explanation of the non- teated variables that must 
also be considered when we attempt to explain the choice of a 
particular farm enterprise . 
In chapter five we hav reproduced a number of the 
regression equations which were used to test the variables set 
out in chapter four . Th first set of regressions is used to 
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measure the variation in beef c ow numbers and intensity of 
row cropping that can be explained by changes in the real and 
personal property taxes . The second part uses a number of 
regression equations to measure the relative significance of 
the independent variables. 
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II . THE PROPERTY TAX 
A. History 
The history of taxation in Iowa dates back to 1838 when 
the first L gislative Assembly of the Territory of Iowa met at 
Burlington (2). Prior to becoming a aeparat~ territory , by a 
United States Congressional A~t on une 12, 1838, Iowa had 
been a part of the Terxitoty of Wisconsir. and therefore 1t 
was natural that the first revenue system would be patterned 
after the system that existed in Wibconsin prior to 1838. At 
that time, most of the revenue for t rritorial expenses waa 
provided by the Federal Government but one of the iirst acts 
by the Legislative Assembly was the establishment of a county 
and territorial revenue ystem designed to bear the local tax 
burdens and also contr ibut e a mall percent to the Territorial 
budget. 
A basic fundamental characteristic that the Iowa local tax 
system carried over from the Wisconain Legislativo Assembly and 
which remains a primary feature today js th concept of 
decentralization . Then as now the tax system for procuring 
local revenue h been administered by the county and/or town-
ship governments . This is in contrast to other revenue 
systems which are administered at the state and federal levels . 
Certain problems arose with the administrat ion of a 
decentralized revenue system and Iowa's early histo1, was 
plagued by inequities in the general property tax . Th~ 
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primart source of in quality was in the as6essment procesr . 
An intergovernmental struggle wa& carried on almost contin-
uousl) until 1897 over vho should hav the power of review or 
equalization of assessed values. The Gystem th2t evolved and 
has re&Jlted in a sati$facto1y equilibrium between state and 
local power puts into the hands of local officials the 
problems of assessing property, a function considered to be 
the foundation of a property tax &y&tem. AlEo in the hands of 
the local officials is the task of administering the levy and 
collecting the revenuE . Jut as Gronouski (7} points out, 
where the property tax is used to finance several layers o! 
government, state parti,ipation becomes mandator} . Iowa ' s 
current program since 1947 strengthened supervisory power of 
the state tax commission and instituted an appointive count) 
as6essor system whose performance is checked by comparing 
assessment ratios over all of the counties in the state . Thi& 
method ha helped alleviate many of the inequitios in tax 
administration in Iowa . 
1 . IbJt decline of the acner l property~ 
Practically beginning !rom the time of its inception , 
the general property tax a a percent of all tax revenue has 
steadily declined both for the United States and for the 
state of Iowa . Mabel Newcom r (22), in her article on the 
decline of the property tax in the United ~tates , shows the 
relative impact of property taxes as a percent of all taxes 
on the state and local level, the state level , and the local 
level for selocted years from 1902 to 1950. Following is ar. 
ext.ract of her tablei 
Table , ~eneral property tax as a p r cent o{ all taxes - . 
(united ~tates 1902·19~oa) 
Year 5tate and local taxos State taxes Local taxes 
1902 82.7tv ~l. 2% 89 . !>% 
1926 80.0 29.0 95 .~ 
1931 75.3 20. 0 95 . 2 
1936 60.2 6 .9 93.l 
1941 48.2 3.4 92 . 2 
1946 43 . 9 2.8 92 . 5 
1950 42 . 4 1.8 89 . 2 
8 Source : ( 22' p. 40). 
Table 2 . Percentage of totnl taxes from property taxes for 
federal, state and locala 
Property Other 
1930 :>1% 49')u 
1932 59 41 
1942 20 80 
19~0 14 86 
a Source: ( 22, p. ~o). 
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Table 3 . Property taxes as a percent of all state and local 
taxes in Iowa& 
Year Percent 
1929 80 
1932 79 
1940 !:>9 
1946 ~4 
1950 50 
1956 50 
8 Source: ( 24 t p . 86). 
For the State of Iowa alone the property tax as a 
percent of al l stato and local taxes is slightly higher than 
for the United States as a whole . 
The 1929 percentage of all &tate and local revenues 
coming from the general property tax repr€sents a decline 
from th2 percent that existed in 1838 (Table 3) . As previous -
ly mentioned the state tax systam as enacted by the Legislative 
Assembl~ provided for a small percent of the gross local tax 
revenue to be contributed to the Territorial Budget . This was 
set by the Assembly at 5 percent with the remainder of the 
total territorial revenue coming from the Federal Government . 
But fox the most part, in the absence of Feaeral and State 
income taxes, gasoline taxes, etc . , the general property tax 
was heavily relied upon to carry the revenue load . Later ~ 
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wi th the de ~ lining importance of the gen~ral propert > tax , 
what sources o f re\ enue t ock up the sla~k for the de ~reasing 
proportion of l ocal tax re venue ? Ta ~ le 4 js an extract of 
anot her of New~omer ' s ta ~les showing the rel ati.e weight of 
various source s of l ocal revenue from 1 02 t o .9~ 1 for t he 
L. n i t ed Sta t es . 
Table 4 . Principal s ourt es of l oca l revenue . in percent)a 
1902 1932 1 '1~ 2 1 c;. 51 
•..; eneral propert y tax 7 3 . 2/l. 70 .2;t. b0.7~ SO . Btt> 
Other taxes 9 . 6 6 . 4 5 . 2 7 . 0 
Sta t e and federal a id 6 . 8 10 . 3 25 . 5 2Cj , 7 
Charges and misce l laneous 10 . 4 13 . 0 8 . 7 12 . S 
a Sc.urce: (22 , p . 41) . 
As indicated oy the taole, a good bit of the decline 0 f 
property tax es as a percent of tota l revenue ls repla ced by 
s t ate and federal oid . The emergence of the Federal Income 
tax and various s tate t ax sources hav_ oecome the main t ech-
niques f or raising state and federal revenue . 
In summar y, what can we say aovut the r ole of the general 
property in Iowa and the ~nited $tates( For the most part, 
as a percent 0 £ a l l r evenue f or state and l ocal and f ur 
federal , s t ate and l cc al gov( rnments c0moined it has dec lined 
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significal"tly. ut for local governmental units alone th 
property t~x has been virtually t~e onl~ source of !~~ 
revonue. From "A Comparative ~tLady oi the Tax Systems of Io a 
and the Surround1nq S t ates" we have accumula t d the following 
data or property tax b~ type of government for the United 
Stttes in 1932 , 1942 and 1950 . 
Table 5. Property tax revenue as percentage of total tax 
revenuea 
T pe of government 
States 
All local units 
Lounties 
Cities 
School districts 
Other 
Al l state and local 
8 Source• (18 229) • ' p . • 
1932 
17. 4 
97. 3 
96 . 4 
99 . 8 
9~ . 5 
73 . 6 
1942 
5.4 
92 . 3 
95 . 2 
87 . 0 
100 . 00 
96 , 2 
47 . 3 
1950 
3 . 5 
88 .2 
95 . 4 
77 . 0 
100. 00 
95 . 2 
43 . ~ 
It is obvious from these data that at the lower echelons 
of governmental administration the property tax is by far the 
chief source of revenue . 
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2 . Rising property tax revenue 
In spite of significant relative declines in personal 
and real property tax revenues the absolute magnitude of 
these funds has continued to rise . Considering that school 
districts get approximately 6~ percent and county governments 
get 63 percent of their total revenues from property tax 
levies , it is apparent that increased costs for these func -
tions will necessitate higher property tax demands . Such has 
been the case . In 1873 approximately $9,360,000 was collected 
in total state and local revenue (2 ) of which about 99 percent 
came from property taxes . Assuming that 20 percent of the 
total property tax at that time came from persona l property 
this means that about $1,872,000 originated from personal 
property levies . 
In 1962 the property taxes levied in the state of Io a 
as reported by county auditors totaled $424 ,493 , 000 exclusive 
of monies and credits (15) . Of this total , aoout 14~ or 
$61 ,480 , 000 came from personal property, an increase of 
$60 , 608,00C over 1873. Thus, despite the relative decline in 
importance of both the general property and the personal 
property tax, the absolute amounts increased a good deal over 
their original levels . Further analysis of the personal 
property tax shows that approximately $25,875,000 or 6 per-
cent of the general propert~ tax collected in the state came 
from personal property levies in the rural district~ while 8 
10 
percent came from personal property in cities and towns . A 
good share of the difference between rural and urban levels of 
personal property taxes is explained by the 1.4 percent 
coming from levies on the personal property in industrial and 
manufacturing plants . When compared to the magnitude of the 
Federal J.3ud9et, the property tax revenue coming from the rural 
districts seems inconsequential . dut the cost of $139 million 
in real property taxes and S25 million in personal property 
taxes is rather substantial for Iowa farmers . 
S. The Personal Property Tax 
A knowledge of the background of the general property 
tax and its trends through the years is essentia l to under-
standing the role that has been played by tha personal property 
tax levy. This is because the personal property tax has 
comprised a relatively stable share of total property tax 
from its beginning . Aa noted by arindley (2) the percentage 
has rarely exceeded 20 and most of the time is around 16 . 
From State Tax Commission reports for 1962 (15), the percent 
of total property taxes coming from personal property was 
14. We can apply the same re&ume to personal property taxes 
that we used for the general property tax--a decreasing 
proportion as regards federal, state and local and state and 
local combined but a relatively constant proportion of ~ 
revenues for local governmental units. Although Table 4 
indicates that other sources of revenue are substituted for 
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tax revenue on the local level, still a large and constant 
proportion of that part coming from taxes is the result of 
property tax levies. 
Since the purpose of this paper is to take a look at the 
personal propert, tax as it affects resource allocation in the 
state of I~wa , we will be concerned pr imari ly with the assess -
ment of personal property and the subsequent collection of 
revenue comprising the 25,875 , 000 coming from rural personal 
property levies . 
As previously pointed out the asses sment of property is 
the foundation of a general property tax system. This is no 
les~ true for per5onal property taxes, but therein lies man y 
of the critic i~ms and problems associated with the personal 
property tax--par ticularly in t he agricultural sector of the 
state of Iowa . In the first place , tne facts of loca l assess -
ment even with state equalization tend to foster certain 
inequities throughout the atate . With greater revenue require -
ments in some counties than i n othors and state limitations on 
certain mil~ rates for expenditures included in the county 
general fund , the necessity for diffeient assessment leve l s 
becomes apparent . In the second place , as early as 1844 
certain exemptions gave tax relief to specified classes of 
agricultural property . These exemptions, combined with unequal 
assessments, have stirred a considerable amount of controversy 
over the present handling of personal propert y taxes in the 
agricultural sector . ~oreover , the idea has been put forth 
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that inequalities in the tax bill oetween states has been 
partly responsible for malad j ustment in resource allocation 
within the state of Iowa . For example , an exces ivel~ high 
personal property tax levied upon beef cows could discourage 
western cow- calf producers from locating herds in southern 
Iowa. Th\s has, in part, accounted for the slow re - allocation 
of resources into non- row crop enterprises in some parts of 
the state . 
To get a better understanding of the problems confronting 
an analysis of property taxes in Io~a, it is well to have in 
mind the basic regulations outlin~d in the Iowa Code covering 
personal propert/ taxes and a feeling for the process of 
administeri ng local proport} taxes . Following is an excerpt 
from the Iowa Code covering the relevant topics in referer1<.e 
to personal propert~ and exemptions . Appendix A gives a 
brief explanation of the assessment and levying of property 
taxes in the state of Iowa. 
Code of Iowa 1962 (13) 
427. 13 What taxable . All other property , real or 
personal , is subject to taxation in the manner prescribed , and 
th1s section is also intended to embrace : 
... 2 . dorses, cattle, mules and asses .Q.Y.Y ™year 
of filllt · 
3 . Sheep and swine ~ nine months of ~· 
The fact that exemptions are included in the Iowa 
personal property tax regulations and further that these 
exemptions are fairly significant in the agricultural sector 
brings up the question of whether this ort of "discrimination" 
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has any affect upon types of farm enterprises . To be more 
specific , uoes the fact th~t beef cows on Iowa farms are 
covered by the personal property tax make them a less profit-
able enterprise when , in the absence of such a levy, they 
would be the most profitable . Proponents of a movement to do 
away with personal property taxes on beef cows argue that most 
other livestock enterprises on Iowa farms are relatively free 
of this levy a11d for this reason show a greater profit than 
would beef cows . 
For instance , in view of the law exempting all cattle 
under one year of age and swi~e and sheep under nine months 
it is possible for a farmer engaged in a feeder catt ' e opera-
tion to buy calves in the fall that were born the previous 
spring and feed them for well over a year a~d still not have 
to pay the personal property tax on them . bince only cattle 
that are one year old on the first of anuary would need to be 
listed with the assessor and since the calvas this farmer 
bought in the fall would not be one year old until the follow-
1ng spring, they would be exempt f or that year . Then , provid-
ing the cattle were sold prior to the next J anuary first , 
there would not be a single dcllar in property tax paid on 
this asset . The case for swine tends to be very lenient also 
because in rare cases are feeder pigs not marketed within nine 
months of age . As far as swine farrowing operations are 
c~ncerned, sows will be subj ect to property taxes only if they 
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are nine months old and held over the first uf January which 
would normall y be the case for earl/ spri ng farrowing. A 
factor t o be considered here, however, is that the ta xaole 
value of a s ow is much l ower relative t o the dollar value c f 
her producticn than would be the case with beef cows --
especially if she is farrowing two litters per year. There -
f ore, the tax bill per dollar of output would be signif ica nt!~ 
less in swine than i n calf productivn. Sheep would face much 
the same situation as swine with the exception that ewes tend 
t o be held l unger than sows and would be subject t o more years 
of tax ation . The tax bill per doll ar of output in sheep 
would mc st likely fall between that f0und in swine and calf 
production. 
In additi on, beef cow owners feel that they are dis -
criminated against in other wa ys . It is nearly impos$ible t o 
conceal the age e r existence of a beef cow while in the swine 
or feeder ca ttle business the inventories fluctuate cunsiderab-
ly and where farmers are permitted t o file their own pruperty 
listings the temptation to omit such classes of livestock is 
much greater. Also , it is mu ch more difficult t o pin down the 
age of young livestock than beef cows . This analysis does not 
pretend t o make a judgment regarding the honesty of assessor s 
or farmers, but the intent is merely t o point up certain 
administrative shortc omings in the personal property tax 
system. In any ca se, at the pres2nt time a personal property 
tax must be paid on each beef cow in the state of Iowa and 
cost considerations must take this into account . It must also 
be pointed out that dairy cows are obviously taxed in the same 
manner as beef cows, but the dairy enterprise was excluded 
from the study because of the ~umerous variables other than 
land quality--such as market proximity, capital requirements , 
specific skills- - that have an influence upon a dairy enter-
prise and tend to make it a le ~s efficient indicator of the 
enterprise an Iowa farmer may be inclined to f ~llow as a 
result oi tax pressures . 
To get an idea of the relative burden of the personal 
propert~ tax upon the cow- calf enterprise, the following table 
is a cost of production schedule for one unit of production or 
a beef cow- calf sold program . 
With this sort of cost -price schedule, it becomes obvious 
that a tax bill of ~3 . 77 per cow- calf unit, which represents 
the state average, constitutes a significant percent of costs 
and net income . 
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Table 6 . Beef cow- calf solda 
Incomes 
90% calf crop, 16% replacement rate 
Calf 450 lbs . X 24¢ X (90% X 84~ ) = 
Cul l cow 1000 lbs. X 13,t X 16% = 
Total receipts 
Costs : 
Corn 
Hay 
4 bu . I $1.25 
2 ton ,2 $16 . 00 
Pasture 4 ton _ $6 . 00 
Protein , salt, mineral 
Breeding 
Vet and medical 
Power and fuel 
Equipment 
Taxes and insurance 
Miscellaneous 
Income over costs 
aSource• (28 9 ) • , p . • 
Total costs 
81. 65 
20 . 80 
102. 45 
5 . 00 
32 . 00 
24.00 
~ . 00 
5 . 00 
3 . 00 
3 . 50 
.45 
4.00 
_L.50 
83 . 45 
19 . 00 
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III. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE PROPERTY TAX 
hen propert taxes are imposed , what will be the result -
ing changes or adjustments in farm enterprise selection? Will 
the administration of a real estate or personal property levy 
inf luence the selection of a farm enterprise? To attempt 
answers to these questions , we must bQcome familiar with the 
characteristics of property t3xes . Are they paid by those 
upon whom the legal liabilit} rests? Do farmers change their 
labor patterns to adjust for higher property taxes? 
A. Incidence 
To assess the value of a budgetary policy we must compare 
the actual tntal effect the imposition of the policy has upon 
the economy with the desired changes we had hoped to achieve 
by implementing it . With any budget policy we have a double 
edged knife wh!ch transfigures the economy from both thg 
revenue and expenditure side. Therefore , if we are to analyze 
the total effect of a particular budget policy , we must follow 
the revenue raising process through to its final resting place 
and we must als~ make a thorough analysis of the total income 
transfer that arises when alloca~ion is affected through the 
public sector rather than through the private sector . Also , 
we must compare the general welfare oi the members of the 
economy before and after the budget policy to determine if a 
change in welfare has occurred . This is an insurmountable 
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task from the standpoint of all public budgets taken together 
and analyzing one particular component, a property tax for 
example, is only slightly more illuminating . A complete 
analysis of the conse uence of a property tax for instance 
would involve answering three questions . (l) ~ho , in the 
final analysis , must make the payment? (2) Who , after the 
revenue is spent and resources are transferred , actua lly 
benefits? (3) Are the marginal benefits accruing to those 
who gain from the tax policy greater than the loss of benefits 
to those making the paymentb? 
A property tax levied for the purpose of building and 
maintaining a school will in the first instance brin~ about a 
transfer of resources from private to public use by taxing 
away private incomes and using the revenue to buy goods and 
services for the construction and administration of the school . 
If the project is successful, the communit} stands to gain 
more in terms of social welfare via the new educational system 
than the cost to the tax payers . The question is, does this 
project actually add to social welfare? Can we make a 
measurement of cost and benefit after year number one &nd 
unequivocall y state that we are better off from having levied 
the tax and built the school house? The fact is, we don ' t 
know . In the first place we cannot measure one pupil's change 
in intelligence and attribute seventy five percent of the 
iffiprovement to the p~operty tax, twenty percent to federal aid 
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to education and five percent to state nid to education . 
furthermor~ after one year or after ten years we cannot say 
that the community is fifty percent better off because certain 
people are relatively poorer because of having to finance the 
&chool while others are much better off by benefiting from 
the new education . The point is, the total benefits accruing 
to society as the result of a particular budget policy and 
commensurate resource allocation are impossible to measure. 
However , we can attempt to measure the direct cost of these 
benefits by analyzing the incidence of the tax method used in 
the budget policy. 
When we speak of tho effect a particular tax ha - upon 
resource allo~ation we must necessarily be interested in the 
"incidence" of that tax . This is the total of all change 
t hat occur from the moment the tax is paid until all i ncomes 
become adjusted to the original levy . Or according to 
Dosser (5), "the total redistributive effect on individual or 
group real incomes that a tax occasions is cal l ed simply its 
incidence". Thus when individual A' s income is reduced by the 
tax and he cannot recover this loss, we say that the 
"incidence" is upon this individual and it is not necessary 
that A be the person who wrote the check to the government in 
fu lfillment of the legal liability . The legal liability or 
"impact" may have been upon individual B but perhaps b was 
capable of recovering the total amount of his loss of income 
by ''shifting" the tax to A. In this case, the impact o{ the 
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tax would not be equivalent to the incidence of the tax i 
they would oe different by as much as it is possible for B to 
shift the tax to A { ~usgrave, 21) . Vhen it is impossible to 
shift the tax further then the incidence is complete~y 
determined . 
It no~ becomes apparent that a study of changing re ource 
al l ocation as t he result of a particular tax must fir&t fix 
the incidence of that tax . It would be ridiculous for instance 
to predict that a high tax upon the manufacturer o{ cigarettes 
would oring about a significant change i n rebource allocation \ 
from cigarette production to chewing gum . We know this 
because we are aware that such a tax can be shifted ~n total 
and that the producers of cigarettes will regain their lost 
income by charging more for the cigare~te& and the consumer 
will ultimately pay the tax bill . However , it i& not universa l-
ly agreed that all taxes can be shifted in such a way that the 
incidence will always ultimately fall upon the final consumer . 
In some cases the individuals legally liable, or upon whom ~he 
impact of the tax falls , also bear the i ncidence because they 
are unable to shift 1 ~ either forward to consumers or backward 
to sellers . Such is probably the case with the personal 
property tax paid by farmers alth ~ugh one should not dive 
head l ong into this con~lusion . 
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B. Shifting 
Among the conditions necessary in order that a tax on 
production may be shifted to the purchaser, one of the most 
critical is a relatively inelastic demand curve for the 
products of the firm . For the single {armer, the demand for 
his product tends to be highly elastic if not perfectly elas-
tic . In other words, in the case of pure competition whero no 
producer individually can influence the market, a tax on 
production cannot be shifted to the purchaser of the products . 
~his condition appears in theory to present a situation 
where, in the short run, the tax imp ~ct is fully upon th 
the farmer but in the long run is partially shifted to the 
consumer . Suppose for example that perfe~t competition existed 
in farming and everyone was operating at the minimum point of 
long run average costs and economic profits were non- existent. 
Obviously , a tax on production would push up the cost curve 
and create economic losses . Adju tment would follow and 
marginal farmers could be expected to ~bandon the farm i n the 
long run , and this would theoretically cause an upward shift 
in the industry supply schedule . ~ince the industry demand 
schedule is relatively inel astic the contracted supply would 
drive up prices . The higher prices paid by consumers for farm 
products would be part of the incidence of the property tax . 
ln practice there are primarily two things lacking in 
this analysis that tend to invalldate it . In the first 
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place this technique assumes throughout that each farmer is an 
optimizer equating marginal cost and marginal revenue to 
maximize his total revenue . Also, it assumes a fixed tech-
nology throughou~ that does not allow for decreases in other 
cost areas to compensate for higher taxes on certain parts of 
the enterprise . Cost cutting techniques are cropping up con-
tinuously that tend to compensate for new and higher cost~ 
in other areas . Secondly, the farmer is not usually optimizin0 
his profits and the imposition of a new cost can usually be 
absorbed when it cannot be shifted . And the tax can hardly be 
shifted by a restriction in supply and subsequent higher 
prices . Historically the number cf farmers has been diminishing 
but the contraction of supply has not followed . Also , although 
Iowa is among the top states in cattle production, the shift 
in enterprises from beef cows to feeder cattle would hardly 
make a significant impact upon the supply of beef for the 
nation as a whole . For these reasons the pure competition 
model, although it comes close to portraying the economic 
situation, does not tell us much about tax incidence . 
1. Shifting the personal property tax 
In practice, it does not appear that the farmer has much 
chance of shifting the personal ~roperty tax . Since the tax 
on cow represents a fixed cost in the very short run , it ma~ 
be spread out over greater output but this capability too is 
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limited . 1 It is not likely that the fermer can hold out for 
more money from his calves to cover the tax cost . ttis chances 
of passing the added cost backward are also limited--at least 
in the short run . It is possible that in the long run his 
reduced profits and hence buying power could cause a ~hift in 
the demand schedule for inputs and result in lower prices, but 
this possibility suffers from the same drawbacks as those con-
fronting higher product prices from restricted supply . The 
impact from this phenomenon in Iowa is hardly likely to make 
a great difference thro~ghout the country and monopoly elements 
in industries supplying the farmer tend to cause a downward 
inflexibility in prices that farmers have to pay . 
In summary it appears that the personal property tax on 
any livestock and for that matter the tax on machinery is not 
able to be shifted . The impact and the incidence of the tax 
1There appears to be three time periods associated with 
costs in beef cow- calf operations . The very short run is that 
period of time within which the size of the cow herd is fixed . 
In most cases this would be a year if the £armer was in the 
habit of breeding cows so that they would have their calves in 
the spring and if he normally got his replacement stock from 
his own herd . If he waa accustomed to buying cows already 
~red , the very short run would be equal to the short run . 
Wi t hin this very short period the farmer ~an spread out the 
tax cost on cows by cutting death loses, using proper breeding 
techniques and thereby producing a higher percent of calves to 
cows . The short run would be the period within which the 
number of cows can be varied to take advantage of particular 
crop rotations that have more pasture . In this case the tax 
would be a variable cost depending upon the size of the herd . 
In the long run , all of the facilities on the farm can be 
varied to accommodate a larger herd of cows--f ences can be I 
changed , pasture l and increased, etc . / 
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are on the same individual . And this l ~ck of shiftability is 
a desirable requisite it one is to say anything about the 
ef iect of the tax upon iarm enterprise selection . 
2 . Shifting the real estate taxes 
The possibility of shifting the property tax on real 
estate is more likely than is the case with the personal 
property tax. If the iarmer is an c~ner- opera tor he faces the 
same shcrt- r un pr0blems of shifting the tax as the farmer who 
pays the production tax on livestock . rle is unlikely t o be 
able t c demand a higher price f vr his products or a l ower 
cos t for the inputs he buys . He cannot ~h1f t the tax either 
f orward or ba~kward . 
In the case of tenancy we ha ve a difteren t sort of 
problem. It there is a high demand f or farm l and or more 
tenants than land available t u r€nt, the ccnditions are ideal 
f vr sh.fting the real estate tax fr0m the l and owner t o the 
tenant in the form of higher rent . Thus the impact would be 
upon the land owner and the incidence upon the renter because 
we have concluded that the farmer is not able t c f urther 
shift the tax either forward or backward . I t is not obvi ous 
however that a higher rEal estate tax is reflected in higher 
rent in the state of Iowa. 
The maj ority of farm le~ses f or renters call for payment 
of one half of the ~orn and soyneans and one-half tc two-
f i f ths of the oats plus a ~ash payment for permanent and 
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rotation pasture land. This arrangement has not changed very 
much over the last decade or so . Assuming fixed proportions 
of grains going to the landlord and fixed pasture rent, about 
the only way the landlord has of retrieving his tax cost ls 
through higher productivity . Based upon this one coul d con-
clude that the landloxd has received a higher total revenue 
from his farm in the lnst fe~ years, but this is not neces -
sarily the result of demanding more rent but rather a charac -
teristic of the lease agreements . Of course higher taxes 
could be paid by shifting the cost forward and charg ing a 
higher cash rent on pa&ture land or for the use of buildings . 
aut according to Iowa State Extencion Economist3 (Kurtenbach) 
there appears to be absolutely no rationale for the level of 
cash rent paid for pasture land in Iowa and furthermore this 
level had not changed much over the last few years . The 
variation in rent payments is quite wide throughout the st 1te 
ranging from $3- $13 per acre for permanent pasture in southern 
Iowa to $12- $18 for rotation pasture in the remainder of the 
state . This would lead onE to question the likelihood of 
shifting the real estate tax by increasing rent Losts 
commensurate with tax increa~es . On the contrar) the tendenc 
ha s been for landlords to share a larger part of the operating 
expenses , particul arly gra s seed , fertilizer , gasoline , etc . 
Since a majority of the lease arrangements in Iowa are 
of the crop- share , cash for pasture variety , the threat 0f 
higher rent charges on pasture would tend to discourage high 
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meadow rotations . This further limits the possibilit y of 
shiiting the real estate tax to the tenant but it may also be 
part of the reason for a higher percent of row crops to total 
acres among tenant farmers compared to owner-oper~tors . If 
the landlord is able to shift the tax to the tenant by higher 
rent on pasture or by demanding a higher percent of the grain 
produced , then the effect of the higher tax upon resource 
al l ocation ~ill depend upon the reaction of the tenant with 
respect to how he behaves in the face of a smaller income . 
Here we encounter the problems of income effects , suLstitution 
effects and risk aversion for the individual farmer . This will 
be covered later in the chapter. 
C. Capitalization 
To the extent that a tax on property cannot be shitted, 
it may be capitaljzed. Capitallzation or the transformativn of 
a flow of wealth i nto a fund operates through the rate of 
interest on capital investments (Seligman , 25) . If the value 
of an asset is fixed by it~ net produce, a tax that decreases 
this net produce will consequently render the asset less 
valuable . Suppose , for example, a t ax is levied upon land only . 
The yield on other assets will then be higher than the yield 
on land . Therefore, if owners of land wish to sell i t they 
must reduce the price to the point where the yield will be as 
high for land as for other assets . If an acre of land is 
expected to yield an annual income of 116 and the going inter9st 
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rate on investments is 4%, the va lue of the land is 16/. 04 
- $400 per acre . I f a l~ tax is levied on the value of land , 
the annual income will fall to $12, a reduction of $4 . Since 
the going rate of interest for all investments is 4~ , the 
reduction in land yield will reduce the value of the land to 
12/. 04 ~ $300 per acre . Subsequent buyers will be willing to 
pay only $300 per acre for the land after the tax . The tax 
will be "capitalized" into the value of the land . This is the 
phenomenon of capitalization and it i s included in the concept 
of tax shifting because , ltke shifting , it operates to change 
the value of an asset . With capitalization , subsequent owners 
( after the imposition of the tax) will not bear any of the tax . 
Rather it wil l be paid by the owner ~t the time the tax is 
levied provided he cann ot shift it . 
The assumptions necessary before capitalization can occur 
are (von Mering , 27) i 
l . The new tax must be unequal . A t ax levied upon the 
earnings of all assets equally will not alter the earning 
capacity of one relative to others and there will be no 
inducement to bid down the price of a particular asset . 
2 . Payment of the tax must be i n the future . It must 
be continuous and the obligation to pay mus t res t with the 
owner . 
3 . The tax will be capital ized only to the extent that 
it cannot be shifted . If the tax is t hifted by raising the 
price of the asset upon which it falls, obvionsly there will 
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be no decrea e in value dua to capitalization . 
4 . The taxed asaet must be Galeable . Personal taxe& 
will not e capita l ized . 
As&uming that neit ler the eal e tate tax on land nor 
the personal property tax on bee1 Lows can be shifted , wi l 
these taxes be capitalized into the value of land or oeef 
cows? Daicoff (4) in his thesis on the capit~lization doctrine 
points ou~ that very little statistics. analysi has Leen 
undertilken in the area of farm taxes and property values . ic 
performed a cross section analysis for the United States as a 
wholo, nevertheless , f1 om Agricultural esea=ch Ser rice data 
for the years 1940-1950 . This decade was chosen so tha~ a 
sufficiently long period of time could elapse to allow a full 
reflection in value changes . From hi s regression analysis, the 
change in t he dollar value per ac e of real estate was best 
a ccounted for by a constant number of dollars (the intercept), 
a positive number (coefficient) times the dollar change in the 
tax levy per acre and a positive number times the dollar va lue 
of real estate per acre in 1940. Joth parameters were sig -
nificant at the 10% level and it could thus be stated with 90 
percent piooability that the tax parameter is positive; high 
taxes being associated with high land values . Also , the coef -
ficient of correlat ion was . 928 indicating that the variance in 
the dependent variable is well accounted for by the tax change 
and the 1940 value per acre . Daicoff ' ~ study seems to refute 
accepted economic theory that higher la~d taxes wi ll mean lower 
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land values. In t~o aggregate un·ted S ates analyses he finds 
that the tax change is positively cor related to changes in 
property values. He also points out that public expenditure 
benefits may more than offset the negative tax effect and there-
by account for the positive relation . This ma) be especially 
pertinent in the citiPS and towns since urban residents tend to 
demand more in terms of public services--police, fire, sanita -
tion, etc. It would oe less true in the rur al districts because 
about the only public expenditure that farmers benefit from 
exclusively is for county roads. This benefit cannot be over-
looked, however, as indicated in a study by the Nebraska 
Agricultural Experiment Stat ion (23). There it was reported 
that, on th~ average, farmers living on dirt r oads would be 
willing to pay $13 per acre more to be located on gravel while 
those already on gravel would pay only $2 more to be on pavement. 
If we can apply this analysis to Iowa's farm land the value of 
farm land does not s tand to benefit much from added expenditures 
on count y roads since nearly all of Iowa's farms are already 
connected ~y gravel roads . 
Since the market for beef cows is relatively mobile 
between states and the productive life of a cow is short 
compared to an acre of land, capitalization as such will not 
occur in determining the value of beef cows . The value of a 
oeef cow is determined primarily by the net return from the 
calf she produces . A tax upon the cow must be paid with the 
income frcm the calf and a higher tax will thus decrease the 
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net return per cow . The primar~ effect of a tax that dis-
criminates between states will oe a relatively smaller number 
of beef cows in the state where higher taxes cut into net 
returns. 
D. Income and Subs ti tution Effects 
The imposition of a property tax upon a farmer wil l 
induce him to (a) work more , (b) v1ork less. or (c) not change 
his working pattern . When a £armer becomes liable for a 
property tax, his income is reduced by the amount of the tax . 
He can be expected to react in one of two different ways: 
On the one hand he may be expected to work harder to maintain 
his before-tax standard of living. This course of action 
could be expected regardless of the nature of the tax . Either 
a fixed cost such as a land tax or a variable cost such as the 
persona l property tax on beef cows will impel him to increase 
his labor intensity to regain his previous income. This 
tendency is called the "income effect" of an increase in taxes . 
A highPr tax will bring forth a greater amount of labor from 
the individual farmer . But working in the opposite direction 
is a "substitution effect" . A lower rate of income because of 
a higher tax on output will also tend to make leisure less 
expensive in terms of income foregone. If leisure is less 
expensive as income decreases more of it will be 11 purchased 0 
and the intensity of labor will decrease. This is the sub-
stit1ltion-eff ect of an increase i n taxes and it is pushing in 
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the opposite direction of the income ef f ect. The substitution 
effect will hold only in the case of a tax that reduces the 
income of the marginal effort of the individual farmer . It 
is the reduction in total work effort that comes about because 
of a lower marginal income resulting from a higher tax on 
production . A tax on successive increments of income would oe 
an example of the kind that induce the substitution effect . 
A higher fixed cost such as real estate taxes will not produce 
a substitution effect. Instead there will be only an income 
effect since the higher tax does not affect the inco11e arising 
from added work effort . 
A tax on beef cows will create both ar. income effect and 
a substitution effect . The income effe:t will reflect the 
farmer ' s attempt to regain his old standard of living and the 
substitution effect will reflect the lower price of leisure 
arising from the tax on his marginal effort . Whether the 
farmer works more or less depends upon which effect dominates . 
He will work more if the income effect dominates but less if 
the substitution effect dominates. If the substitution effect 
and the income effect cancel each other out there will be no 
change in the pattern of labor intensity. 
A cross - section analysis of Iowa was made to determine 
whether or not differences in the use of farm land could be 
accounted for by different levels of real estate and/or 
personal taxes . The regression tests are shown in Chapter V. 
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E. Avoiding the Tax 
The tax may not even have an impact effect if farmers 
take steps to avoid it . Avoidance would occur only when the 
farmer had at his command certain alternative enterprises 
which were free from the tax or at least taxed at a lesser 
rate . Even at this, enterprise substitution would occur only 
if the tax became large enough to neutralize a higher yield-
ing enterprise and make it profitable to change to an untaxed 
enterprise that was inferior prior to the tax but more profit -
able afterward. In this way, the property tax that threatens 
to discriminate against a particular enterprise and consequ~nt ­
ly causes 1 ~hift away from that enterprise may induce a 
misallocation of resources even in the absence of tax payments . 
The threat of a property tax on cows that causes farmers to 
avoid that type of enterprise would consequently tend to 
increase the supply and decrease the income potential of 
alternative enterprises . 
In consideration of shifting enterprises in Iowa from 
baef cows to feeder cattle , swine or sheep, a certain dis -
equilibrium in livestock investment, not completely unlike the 
disequilibrium in the capital market referred to by Harberger 
(9), will result in a lower net income from all livestock 
enterprises . A shift of capital from the taxed to the untaxed 
assets in the cattle industry in Iowa must naturally compel 
Iowa farmers to import feeder stock from surrounding states . 
At first gl ance one would theorize that a reduction in beef 
cows would necessarily reduce the number of feeder cattle . 
This is true if one ls considering the Lountry as a whole but 
from the standpoint of one state it does not necessarily 
follow. The reduction in cows in Iowa will put increased 
demands on out- of - state cow herds . The result will be t hat 
buyers will bid up the price of calves or feeder stock and 
thus maKe it profitable for out - of - state ranchers to expand 
their co~ herds. Due to the lag in ti ~e between decisions 
t o increase production and the subse4uent market date, and 
assuming certain economi es of scale in calf produc t ion , 
ranchers will tend to over- produce in response to increased 
demands. Consequently we inherit a large cattle population 
and l ower prices . Of course a shift t o swine er sheep could 
have a similar net effect on supply and prices in these 
enterprises . 
F. Risk 
The 4uestion also arises as to whether a reduction in 
income due to higher taxes or, for that matter , any other 
income reducing factor wi ll change the amount of risk a farmer 
is willing to undertake in selecting his farm enterprise . 
Obvious l y, each individual farmer has his own degree of 
aversion to risk and the enterprise he selects will reflect 
this . ~·usgrave (21) treats this problem as it applies to 
investments carrying different percentages cf risk. A similar 
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analysis may be applied to the effect of taxes upon one type 
of enterprise independent of the other in the agricultural 
sector . tie shall adapt Musgrave ' r. risk aversion model to the 
farmer ' s enterprise selection and build our hypothesis upon 
it . 
From Heady (10, p . 241) it i& noted that cow herds with 
calves fattened have a significantly lower index of variability 
of income than do feeder yearlings or two- )ear old feeders . 
In other words beef cow herds tend to have fewer bad year~ and 
also fewer good years than found in feeder cattle . However, 
along with the greater risk associated with feeder cattl e is 
the possibility of greater returns . These two concepts are 
shown by t11e left side of Figure l. 
In the southwest quadrant is the function showing the 
relationship between the percent of cows to cows pl~s feeder 
cattle and the yield accruing to the two enterprises . The 
hori zontal axis shows the percent of cows to cows plus feeder 
cattle . As one moves to the left from zero, the relative 
number of feeder cattle declines . We move toward zero as the 
relative number of beef cows declines . Th origin therefore 
would indicate a specialization in feeder cattle while the 
weight of beef cows increases as we move to the left. On the 
vertical axis is measured the yield resulting from various 
mixes of the two enterprises which in~reases as one moves 
down from zero. The slope of the function t
0 
t ells us that 
yields are higher as one moves toward specialization in feeder 
c 
C+F 
35 
0 
yield 
/,, 
_,,,// I 
- I 
G 
Figure 1 . Derivation of optimum- asset curve 
yield 
36 
cattle and lower as we move toward beef cow-calf enterprisel:> . 
In the northwest quadrant we find the relationship 
between risk and the mix of cow to feeder cattle production . 
Again, measured on the horizontal axis is the percent of be f 
cows to cows plus feeder cattle. But on the vertical axi s i s 
the percent of risk r which increases from zero as we move 
up the vertical axis. 
k 
r = -i~l q1p1 where q1 q2 • •• Gk qk+l •. • q0 are the 
expected rates of return to the extent that qi < qi+l and 
qk ~ o, and if the probability of the occurrence of qi is pi 
n 
so tha t J. pi = 1 . 
i==l 
Since the values of all q's from the beginning to qk are 
negative , r is posii:ive . The functional relationship between 
risk and beef cows is negative as shown oy the curve a b . 
In other words, a relative increasa in beef cow numbers 
represented by a movement to the left on the horizontal axis 
is fol lowed by a decline in risk . Feeder cattle are the 
riskier enterpr ise as shown by a higher value oi r as the 
factor F (feeder cattle) increases relative to co ~ . 
A derivation of tho two functions t
0 
and a b is shown 
in the northeast quadrant b) e0 with risk measured on the 
vertica l axis and yield measured on the horizontal axis . This 
11 optimum inve stment f unction" shows the combinations of r i sk 
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and yield we can expect by varying the enterprise mix. It is 
positively inclined indicating that expected yield is greater 
only if one assume s higher r]sk . It is important to point out 
that all points to the left of where this curve first becomes 
horizontal at G are inferior to G because a redu~tion in yield 
t o the left of this point is not accompanied by a reduction in 
risk. Given the enterprise mix associated with point G, the 
substitutions of cash, which presumably involves no risk and 
no yield, for the enterprise combinati on wi ll result in a 
movement from G down to the origin . 
In this model the farmer ' s choice of risk and yield is 
determined by his indifference map given by indifference curves 
Ii . These are constructed under the assumption that his 
capital investment is fixed . They slope up and to the right 
becoming less steep as they move away from the horizontal axis 
and as they shift to the right with greater levels of utility. 
The reason for the decreasing slope becomes more obvious when 
we consider that at higher levels of risk, a higher yield is 
reyuired to compensate for the increased risk while at low 
levels of risk, a great deal more risk will be suostituted 
for a small increase in yield. The slopes of successive 
indifference curves flatten out when moving up and to the 
right . This is due to the diminishing marginal utility of 
lncome as income rise s and the increase in marginal disutility 
of risk as risk rises . This assumes that at high levels of 
income it will take a greater increase in income to d5sume a given 
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increase in risk than at lower levels of income. 
The farmer will endeavor to move to higher indifference 
curves by moving up or down on his optimum investment function 
e
0
• His optimum point will be where e
0 
i& tangent to the 
highest indifference curve. 
To this point the analysis of risk has not deviated 
significantly from what we found in Musgrave. The only 
variation concerns the nature of risk as one moves from all 
beef cows to a higher proportion of feeders (a b) . We have 
assumed that any proportion of feeder cattle greater than zero 
will not decrease risk. Therefore we get a monotonically 
decreasing function sloping down to the left in the northwest 
quadrant of the diagram. 
What happens as a per head tax is applied to oeef cows? 
The first effect would appear to be a reduction of yield at 
every level of beef cow production from cow number one to the 
point where total assets were in cows. This is given by the 
new function t 1 which is different from t 0 by the tax per cow 
times the number of cows . Of course where cows are zero , tl 
would equal t
0
• 
The reduction in yield due to the tax on beef cows will 
also bring about a shift in the optimum investment function . 
The new yield curve t 1 will give rise to a new investment 
function e1 which is shifted to the left. This tells us that 
at the same level of risk before and after the tax , yield will 
be less after the tax . We have not told the whole story, how-
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ever , about how the farmer wlll rea ct t o his new risk and 
1ield situation as a result of the tax. 
If we assume the same indifference map before and after 
the tax,1 a shift of the optimum investment curve to the left 
will reduce yield with the same risk and the point mt will 
be reached. But mt does not lie on the highest indifference 
curve so the farmer can increase his total utility b> 
shifting his investment to feeder cattle and move to the point 
where e1 is tangent to the highest indifference curve. The 
points of equilibrium or maximum total utility will trace out 
the curve c m which slopes upward to the left as taxes are 
increased on beef cows. The adjustment of risk and yield 
seems to presuppose an income effect that will lead to more 
risk taking as income is decreased by the tax on cows. The 
income effect will eventually taper off after the point is 
reached where the added risk is not compensated for by the 
increase in yield . The question of what will happen in the 
extreme cases of very low yields on feeders relative to 
cows or high risk on beef cows appears irrelevant for the 
Iowa farmer because he can always abandon both enterprises 
rather than subject himself to a very low level of yield . 
Complete dependence upon the government land retirement 
1This also assumes that the indifference map of an 
individual is independent of the level of changes in risk and 
yield . 
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program may be a more desirable alternative in this instance. 
On the basis of this model of risk aversion and yi eld it is 
logical to hypothesize that an increase in the tax on beef 
cows would cause a shift into other enterprise& . In Chapter V 
we shall make some empirical tests to accept or reject this 
hypothesis. 
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IV . EMPIHI CAL f.10DELS 
In our empirical tests, two models are used. The first 
model is intended to test the effect of property taxes on 
farm land-use intensity. The second includes a number of the 
dominant v8riables influencing farm enterprise selection in 
order that we may assess their relative importance. In the 
first part of this chapter we will list the test variables 
that will be used in each model . In the second part we will 
look at some of the non- tested variables that are important 
in selecting farm enterprises. 
A. Tested Variables 
l. Dependent variables 
It is necessary that an indicator of enterprise selec -
tion be identified that will fit into our tax models . Since 
this study is primarily intended to establish the effect of 
property taxes upon enterprise selection and, furthermore, 
since cow-calf operations s eem to bear the heaviest tax burden, 
it was decided to try and determine whether different property 
tax rates are in any wa y correlated with different beef cow 
numbers . Obviously, measuring beef cow numbers is not the 
only way to categorize a farm enterprise, but for our purposes 
it would appear to be the best for a number of reasons . In 
the first place, according to Heady (10), for farmers with 
limited resources the greatest return generall) comes from 
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the enterprise which maximizes on the scarcest resource. 
From data compiled by C. C. .alone (20) the feed re4uirement 
for hogs makes up about 80 percent of total cost while labor 
comprises 7 percent. In cattle fattening, feed costs make 
up 85 percent of total cost while 5 percent goes to labor. 
In the farm cow-calf herd 65 percent of total cost goes into 
feed and 10 percent goes into labor. From this it is evident 
that in areas where feed is abundant the greatest return will 
result from enterprises which require more feed relative to 
labor . Such is the case in the more productive areas of Iow3 
where feed is generally abundant relative to the labor input 
and feeder cattle and hogs are generally conceded to be the 
mo&t profitable enterprise. As feed becomes more scarce 
relative to labor the cow-calf herd would appear to become 
more profitable. for this reason we divided Iowa's enterprises 
very generally into cow-calf production and other enterprises 
which for the most part would be hog production or cattle 
fattening. In this way a measure of the one variaole, cow 
numbers, will give us a broad indication of land use intensity 
and the type of farming. 
Also , in almost any area of the state if some sort of 
non - tillable land is available, stock cows will often be 
kept to utilize it. Thus the cow numbers will be a direct 
reflection of the percent of non-tillable land in use. 
In our first model, in addition to using the livestock 
enterprise as an indicator of the predominance of the income 
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or substitution effect associated with risk aver6ion , we will 
use a measure of land use intensity as another dependent 
variable to be tested with the real and the personal property 
tax . 
a. ~ £:.9:1! numbers The variable measuring beef 
cow numbers is well adapted to testing the hypothesis that a 
' tax on beef cows will cause the iarmer to assume greater risk 
in an effort to regain lost income (see the previous model 
adapted from Musgrave) . The Annual Farm Census ( l4a) gives the 
number of beef cows two years old and older for each count) 
in the state. In order to correct for differences in count) 
size t he total number of beef cows wa& divided by the total 
land area in farms for each county . The 4uotient , indicating 
the number of beef co~s per acre , showed a statewide average 
of . 0273 . (See variable number l . The table in Appendix C 
gives the number of head per 100 acres . ) 
A desirable characteristic of this variable ls i t s high 
coefficient of variation mea6ured by C -= S/X where S is the 
standard deviation and X is the mean. (C values for all the 
variables are in Appendix c . ) This must be explained either 
in terms of measuring error or by the fact that a wide 
variation in beef cow number6 does occur over the counties in 
Iowa . If each county actually had the same number of cows 
per acre but our data showed o high degree of dispersion, we 
would only conclude that there were errors in our measuring 
techniques. Granted the measuring techniques are not 
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infallible ; we, nevertheless , have no ba&i5 {or expecting 
e~ual numbers uf beof cows per acre for all counties in Iowa . 
On the other hand if w~ have aspirati 0ns f or using this 
variable as an indicat or of farm enterprises, ~e would hope 
for wide variation because there is a relatively wide varia-
ti on in both land ~uality and tax burden . 
It must be recognized of course that when one begins t o 
a verage over a county wide area there is scme ri&k of losing 
part of the in t ormoti on from the sample . Fer example a county 
c ould be topographically divided with half 01 the area being 
well suited f or row crops and the remainder very ro lling and 
unsuitable for row crops . Halt ~ould have a small number and 
half a l arge number of cows . In this case averaging beef 
cow numbers for every acre in the county would produce an 
outcome comparable to a county of median quality soil, through-
out and the median number of beef ccws when, actual ly, the two 
counties are very difierent . dcwever, in an attempt to 
correct for this, the denominator wa~ made t o in~lude all 
crop land plus both temporary and permanent pasture . 
b . Land ~ intensity Another dependent variable 
that may prove helptul in measuring 1arrner react ion t o higher 
taxes i~ his intensity of land use . The hypothesis t o oe 
tested here is whether or not a change in taxes and thus 
income will explain any of the variation in the ratio of row 
crop acres t o t otal land area . I t must also be recognized 
that our analysis depends upon wh~t we as sume about optimal 
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resource allocation by the individual farmer. In other 
words, we must as sume the same level of efficiency or 
managerial ability before and after the change in taxes. 
It is apparent that the potent ial yield of corn or 
soybeans that a farm is capable of producing would be 
very important in directing the use of the land resources . 
However, the yield data for crops in Iowa are calculated 
from the acres a ctually used f or that crop. Therefore , the 
figures given for yields per acre are not very g~ od predictors 
of the over all 4uality of the farm land in the county. 
If, for instance, only 10 percent of a county was t opograph-
ically suited for corn production but if that 10 percent 
was capaole of averaging 90 bushel s per acre of corn the 
productive capacity of the t 0tal county would be biased if 
one were t o l ook only at the corn yield per acre . To 
correct for this and get a better indicator of both l and 
capability and intensity two methods evolved . 
The first was t o calculated the t otal dollars worth 
of corn produced, add this t o the t ot a l dollars worth 
of soybeans produc ed and di vide the sum by the t ota l 
acres on farm land (s ee var iable x4 , App end ix C). The 
result is a sort of cash output var iable that gives the 
average dollars per acre from 
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rov crops in each county. 1 The sacond method was to ~imply add 
11t was the original intent of this study to isolate and 
pair off areas of equal soil quality and topography and then 
measure tax levels and beef cow numbers as a method of 
detecting the relationship that might exist between them. It 
was hoped that this technique would isolate and measure the 
personal property tax effect upon beef co~ numbers. This 
meant that equal soil type areas would have to be measured on 
the same basi' as stock cow numbers and mill rates . Un-
fortunately each of these measured variables encompassed 
different geographical boundaries. The mill rate is consistent 
only within each rural school district, the beef cow numbers 
are compiled only on a per township basis and &oil asso~iations 
follow boundaries completely independent of the previous two. 
Therefore, the only good observation would be of township 
si1e where the whole township was in the same aoil association 
area and in the same taxing district. This observation would 
then be compared to another township of the same size coming 
from the same soil a& &ociation area but from a different 
taxing district and therefore reflecting a different tax rate. 
A ~omparison could then be made to see if a variation existed 
in beef cow numbers. The problems of dra~ing a very large 
sample of this type became immediately obvious. It is dis~ 
couraging just to isolate township size units that have the 
same soil type throughout; to say nothing of trying to find such 
units with a wide vari ation in tax rates. 
5ince the original reason for selecting areas with 
equivalent soil and topographic characteristics was to find 
land that had equal capacity for producing cash crops, it was 
decided that a better variable could be obtained by counties 
which had equal cash crop potentials. This kind of variable 
had the advantage of being easier to obtain at the same level 
as beef cow numbers and tax rates. This advantage seemed to 
considerably outweigh the di&advantag&s inherent in aggregating 
the data on the county level. Furthermore, by aggregating, it 
becomes possible to take a state wide sample rather than being 
restricted to areas that had been extensively soil mapped. We 
settled on two measures of land quality . Variables x
9
, ~how-
ing the ratio of row crops to total land in farm&, and x4 show-
ing the estimated cash output per acre of all f ann land in the 
county were chosen. It is recognized also that these variables 
do not give a correct indication of potential productivity for 
a particular ~ounty. Instead, they are measures of past 
performa nce but I am inclined to believe th3t farmers base 
decisions as much on pa&t history as on future expectations. 
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the total acres of corn to the total acres of soybeans and 
divide this sum by total acre& in farm land (see variable x9}. 
The second variable, x9 , proved to be the most useful because, 
although the two are highly correlated (r4 , 9 = .924, &ee 
Appendix B), when used in regression& with x4 it always 
assumed dominance. This could be due in part to the neutraliz· 
ing behavior of corn and soybean yields per acre which are 
an integral part of variable x4 • 
2. Independent variables 
~a The average mill rate for county rural districts. 
The average rural mill rate for a county is derived by dividing 
the total tax collected in ell rural districts by the total 
assessed value of all property. Thia method corrects for 
exceptional variations in mill rates that may oc~ur between 
rural tax district& in each county. Districts with a low 
total assessed value but a high mill rate will not bias the 
county average when calculated in this manner. 
~3 a Corn yield per acre. The state mean yield per acre 
for 1962 was 7~.l bushels with a range from 54.5 bushe ls in 
Decatur to 91.8 bushels in Cedar county. 
~· Ratio of cash output from corn and soybeans to 
the total farm land per county. 
~· Average farm &ize. Thi& variable wag included in 
some of the regression models on the basis of the hypothesi & 
that a profitable beef-cow operation would have to be 
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associated with a rather extensive use of the land resource. 
Ihnen (12) indicates that the average total cost curve for 
beef cow-calf production is similar to crop production in that 
it passes through decreas1n9 and increasing stages. He 
maintains that labor requirements per head and cost per unit 
decline as acreage and the size of the beef cow herd increases. 
When the level of acreage and beef cow herds is reached where 
hay and pasture must be purchased, the cost per unit begins to 
increase. The correlation matrix (Appendix B) indicates that 
this variable is significantly correlated with only two other 
variables, x8 {r5 , 8 = -.35~1} and x18 {r~, 18 = -.4976). As 
predicted, the sign of the regression coefficient is positive 
but the t value for regressions in which X~ was used ranged 
from .9187 (significant only at 40%) to 2.7682**. 1 Although 
it helped explain some of the variation in each model in which 
it was used, it did not appear powerful enough to include 
in the final model. 
~i The ratio of assessed value to market value per 
acre for land and buildings (16). This variable was intended 
to detect the correlation between land quality as measured by 
either x4 or x9 and the ratio of assessed to market value. 
As expected, there is a negative correlation (r1 , 4 = -.6632 
and r 1 ,9 ~ -.6980) with both variables and they are significant 
11n this and subsequent tests, ** indicates significance 
at l percents * indicates significance at ~ percent. 
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at the .Ol probability level. This bears out the notion that 
more valuable land tends to be asses sed at a lower ratio. 
x6 was not effective in either of the two regres ions in which 
it was included and, in addition, the sign was reversed in the 
two equations. Thi s variable too wa& eliminated from con-
sideration in the final model. 
~7 2 Taxes per acre as a percent of market value per 
acre. This variable was intended to weight the actual tax 
cost per acre according to land value . It was calculated by 
dividing average tax dollars per acre by the average market 
value per county. Variable x7 was found to be highly 
correlated with many other variables but this is becau&e of 
the makeup of the variable. Since it is calculated by u&ing 
the mill rate , the assessed value and the market value, it is 
naturally very closely linked with the other variable& that 
are derived from nearly the same data. It was also nonsig-
nificant in the regression models in which it was used. 
~8 1 Average real estate tax per acre. This variable is 
the product of th• average rural mill rate time' the average 
assessed value . The mean tax per acre for the state wa5 
3.91 with a range from $1 . 8~ in Wonroe county to $6 . 00 in 
Polk county . 
~· Ratio of acres of corn and &oybeans to the total 
farm land per county. 
~15 : The tax per head. This is calculated by multi -
plying the aa&essed value per cow by the average rura l mill 
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rate per county. The &tate-wide average in 1962 was $3 .77 
with a range from $2 .28 in Dubuque county to $5 .24 in Polk 
county and a standard deviation of . 530 . The assessed values 
for beef cows were obtained from the state tax commission 
where averages for each county were compiled from township 
data submitted by the county assessors. 
~16 s Soybean yield per acre. The state mean yield per 
acre for 1962 was 27.l bushels with a range from 19.l bushels 
in Howard county to 33.3 bushels in Scott and Sac counties. 
~17 s Percent of farms operated by tenants. The economic 
rationale behind this variable was that tenant farmers tend 
to use the land more intensely, producin9 more row crops, 
less pasture and consequently keeping fewer cows. The owner-
operator on the other hand will be more in~lined to conserve 
his land and use less intense rotations, more pasture land, 
etc. The correlation coefficients supported the expectations 
in rather convincing fashion. x17 wa6 highly significantly 
correlated with both x1 (r1 , 17 ~ -.5816) and x9 (r1 , 9 = 
.8982). The signs were el10 consistent in that tenancy was 
negatively correlated to beef cow numbers and positively 
correlated with intensity. As a 61delight, x17 was 
regressed on x9 and below is the outcome. 
x9 = - .03037 + .00853 x17 
T = +20.1311** 
R2 = .81 
F = 40~.26** 
R = .90** 
It is obvious that the relationahip between x9 and x17 can be 
attributed to more than just chance since t, f and h are all 
highly significant. 
Beyond this point x17 proved of little use when thrown in 
with some of the other independent variable;. Not only wa& the 
sign of the regression coefficient reversed in two regressions 
but in only one case did it reach a high level of significance 
and this was probably because there were only three other 
independent variables in the equation. Apparently its s ig-
nificance was absorbed by some of the other variables in the 
larger models. 
x18: Perc ent of buildings to land and buildings (assessed 
value). This variable was included on the~ priori basis that 
the building requirement is greater for feeder cattle and 
swine operations than for beef cow enterprises. The correlation 
coefficient left some doubt about this; the correlation between 
x1 and x18 wa s only + .0012, whi ch is barely positive. Unlike 
x17 , which seemed to lo&e its s ignificance when combined with 
other variables, x18 alone tells us very little but when 
combined with various other variables explains a large share 
of the variation in beef cow numbers. 
B. Non-tested Variable s 
l . Economic 
a. Land ouality To get the total picture, we first 
find the farmer in a specific natural environment with respect 
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to soil quality, topography and climate whi~h we 6hall as~ume 
can be adeGuately cate9ori2ed with our intensity or cash 
output variables. On the basis of this information alone, we 
would expect each £armer to Loncentrete on the enterprise in 
which his comparative advantage is the greatest . In central 
and northern Iowa the gently rolling topogr phy, mild climate 
and highly productive soil favor the production of corn. And 
since the cash potential of this crop makes the opportunity 
~ 
costs of other crops rather high it becomes evident that the 
selection of a profit maximizing enterprise will most likely 
include the corn growing activity. On the other hand , as one 
moves into southern Iowa, the change in soil types and topo-
graphy makes the selection of a maximum prof it enterprise less 
clear cut. As the percent of tillable soil decrease& and as 
productivity decreases due to poorer soil quality and topo-
graphy the intense production of corn no longer remains an 
obvious maximum profit enterpr1$e . If the corn yield per acre 
gets low enough , a point will be reached beyond where it 1& 
no longer the optimum enterpri6e. A substitute could very well 
be legumes or some form of permanent pasture. 
One thing must be kept in mind regarding the alternatives 
available and the natural environments as they affect the 
state of Iowa . Whereas an intense corn product ion program in 
central Iowa is most likely the optimum profit plan, the 
alternatives are not nearly as restricted as the alternatives 
found in southern Iowa. For exaMple, a Grundy county farm 
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with a corn Lapability of 125 bushels per acre could also be 
an outstanding legume producing unit . A change in the relative 
cost or price structure could easily be followed by a sub-
sequent switch in the farm enterprise . This farm would have 
an absolute advantage in almost any t~pe of enterprises when 
compared to southern Iowa . 
The flexibility we find in central and north central Iowa 
does not carry into the two southern tiers of counties . A 
relative change in prices for farm products would not reflect 
a concurrent change in types of farming in this area. If a 
farmer with a cow- calf operation suddenly experienced a sudden 
drop in beef prices but a rise in corn prices he would not be 
in as good a position to make the switch to corn as would the 
farmer in central Iowa. 
Using two budget models, Ihnen (12) shows that the farm 
enterprise using a cow-calf activity could result in lower 
costs per unit of output for certain soils in ~outh central 
Iowa . Budget model l was for producing crops only and renting 
out the pasture while model II was for crop& and a cow-calf 
operation combined . Each model was applied to three type5 of 
farms , hilly, average, and upland in the same soil association 
area. In this case , the soil association was Shelby-Grundy-
Haig because the study was concentrated in southern Iowa. Of 
the three faI1Il type&t upland was best suited to row crop 
production and hilly was least suited. Within each type of 
farm in each model he calculated the minimum average cost for 
five machinery combinations along with the acreage over which 
this minimum cost would apply. Below is an extract of the 
tables showing the cost per dollar of output for his two models . 
Ihnen's study produces some interesting results as shown 
in the two tables. In both models the lowest cost per dollar 
of product was generally from the largest machinery combination 
and crop acreage within each type of farm. Also, within each 
model, the minimum average cost for a particular machinery 
combination was on the upland farm with hilly farms being 
highest in average cost. When we compare models we find more 
interesting results. The crop and cow-calf model (II) has a 
lower minimum average cost for each machinery combination on 
hilly farms than does the crop model (I) on hilly farms. On 
average farms, in comparing models we find that for each 
machinery combination the minimum average cost for II is less 
than I . But for upland farms the reverse is trues model I is 
superior, in terms of minimum average costs, to model II. 
This study merely lends support to the theory that a crop 
and cow-calf enterprise may be more profitable on the poorer 
quality soil 1n southern Iowa. One of the assumptions of this 
study, however, is that there is no change in the total tiveriable 
cost and total revenue for crop production alone in the two 
models. This implies that the machinery requirements for the 
cow-calf and crop model cannot be less than for the model with 
crops alone. In fact, one would be inclined to think from 
lhnen's analysis that the machinery and equipment requirements 
would be somewhat higher for the cow-calf model. 
Table 7. Model !--without livestock8 
Costs per dollar of crop product for selected machinery 
combinetion1 on the Shelby-Grundy-Haig farms 
Machinery 
combination 
Hilly farma 
2-plow 
3-plow 
2- plow, 2 plow 
2-plow, 3-plow 
3-plow, 3- plow 
Average farms 
2- plow 
3- plow 
2 -plow , 2-plow 
2- plow, 3-plow 
3-plow, 3-plow 
UplAnd f arma 
2 -plow 
3•plow 
2-plow, 2-plow 
2- plow, 3- plow 
3-plow, 3-plow 
Minimum average 
cost crop acreage 
160 
200 
280-320 
320 
320-360 
160 
240 
280-320 
320-400 
360-440 
120 
160 
200 
280-320 
320 
8
Sourcea { 12, p. 114-139). 
Minimum average 
cost 
$1 . 30 
1.24 
1.14 
1.08 
1.09 
1.13 
1.02 
l.00 
. 93 
. 93 
.73 
.62 
.67 
• 58 
.~7 
56 
Table 8. Model II--crops and l1vestock8 
Cost per dollar of crop and livestock product for selected 
machinery combination on the Shelby-Grundy-Haig farms 
Mac.hinery tt.inlmum average Minimum average 
comb?-natlon cost crop acreage cost 
Hi lly farm: 
2-plow 160-200 $1.06 
3-plow 200 1.03 
2-plow, 2-plow 280-360 .98 
2-plow, 3-plow 320-360 .95 
3-plow, 3-plcw 320-360 .95 
Average farmi 
2-plow l.60 1.05 
3-plow 240 .97 
2-plow, 2-plow 280-360 .95 
2-plow, 3-plow 320-440 .90 
3-plow, 3-plow 320-480 .90 
Upland f a:rm: 
2-plow 120 . 75 
3-plow 160 .66 
2-plow, 2-plow 200 .70 
2- plow, 3-plow 280 .62 
3-plow, 3-plow 280-320 .62 
a Sources {12, p. 1~2). 
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b. Capital lt is possible that personal property 
taxes on farm machinery may work in favor of rather than 
against the bee{ cow enterprise. If this sort of influence is 
to happen, we must assume that the machinery reGuirements are 
lower for cow-calf operations than they are for intense row 
crop operations. To test this assumption a group comparison 
was made between the average machinery compliment of the 12 
counties of northwest Iowa where the median intensity ratio, 
x9 , is highest and the 11 counties in 60uth central Iowa 
~here the median intensity ratio is lowest and tht total 
number of beef cows is highest . The machinery data is not 
complete because the only data available are for the number of 
tractors , grain combines, corn pickers , forage harvestors , 
hay balers , and motor trucks (14~. The dollar figures for 
each county were calculated by dividing the total number of 
each machine by the number of f arrns in each county to arrive 
at the number of or fraction of each machine per farm. The 
price per machine, as set out in the Iowa Farm Planning 
~.anual (17), was depreciated by one-half and then multiplied 
times the number of machines per farm and totaled to get the 
average machinery compliment in dollars for each farm in a 
county. Much of the equipment used on Iowa farms is omitted 
in this comparison but the important items for pointing out 
county differences are included (6ee Table 9). 
A comparison of the group means with the t test only 
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Table ~ . The average value per farm for the major items of 
machinery 
1Jorthwe st J owa 
i3uena Vista 
Cherokee 
Clay 
.Jickinson 
Emmet 
Lyon 
O' Brien 
Osceola 
Pa l o Alto 
Pl ymouth 
P<.cc.hontas 
~ioux 
Total 
x1 .;_ 
.J 5 964 
6 330 
6222 
6028 
61~4 
6323 
S 7 36 
.. 71,9 0 2 
S9Sl2 
t - - 8 . 656-K* 
.Xl - X2 
~outh Central I owa 
Appanoose 
Llarke 
J ecatur 
Lucas 
1. adison 
.. a ri on 
;. onroe 
Ringg old 
Union 
Warren 
Wayne 
Total 
x ::. 
2 
d.f. :: 2 1 
~ 3 ~ 45 
3S':t8 
3735 
4206 
4410 
3S27 
4COS 
4 C c.9 
3831 
3~38 
3974 
proves what is general kno~ledge . 1 ore machinery per farm is 
used f or high r ow cr op operati ons. · Thjs would mean a highlr 
machinery tax base f or northwest Iowa and higher personal 
property taxes . The dif f erence between the means of the twc 
sections, 2018 , ii taxed at the s t ate average mill rate, 
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65.666, would account for about 12 difference for each farmer. 
This difference would not appear to go very far in justifying 
a shift out of high row crop intensity programs into beef cows 
to avoid the personal property tax. Adding a full line of 
machinery would not change the difference in total machinery 
value very much. 
Capital availability i& largely independent of environ-
mental conditions except, as previously stated, where natural 
conditions put considerable restraint on profitable activities 
in the agricultural sector. This is apparent in Iowa as 
evidenced by the higher interest rates and tighter capital 
restrictions in southern Iowa. An element explaining a part 
of the difference in interest rates in central or northern 
Iowa and southern Iowa is the nature of the enterpri&e to be 
financed. Financial institutions are nut at all reluctant to 
loan a high percentage on feeder cattle providing the farmer 
ha& feed available . This 1 conGidered a very safe chattel 
loan and the competition in this area of iinancing ha& held the 
rate low. The risk may be high !or the farmer but it is low 
for the banker because at worst the selling pri~e of the 
cattle need only Gover the purchase price in order for the 
loan to be retired. Financing cow•calf or dairy herds involves 
more risk !rom the banker's standpoint because they tend to be 
longer in duration and the equity does no~ build up in a cow 
as rapidly as it does in a calf or yearling feeder. Vie find, 
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theref cre, higher interest rates and provisions for partial 
repayment in the financing oi cow- cali operation& . lt should 
oe pointed Cl.it that interest ratos tend to be a f unctiun o'f 
the type of farming rather than the reverse . ith regard to 
capital available for f inanc·ng real estate, jud9in9 from t he 
changes in land values there appears to be no partl(ularly 
high cvncentratlon in any part ot the state . Only in south 
central Iowa was a small dcwnward trend in land prices detected 
( •. aas, 19). 
c . Labor We have been assuming throughout that the 
supply of l dbor is homogeneous and completely mobile over the 
entire state. Thi& may oe an unwarranted assumption. It is 
pOS!:ible that some parts vf the state have a more ple11tiful 
supply and a higher ~uality of farm labor than others. We 
ignored tbese vari&tion& due t o the dif iiculty in measuring 
the ~uality and ~uantity of tarm laoor . 
2 . In$titutlonal 
Institutional c.haracteristits are another important 
influence in the sclec.tion of farm enterprises . <Jovcrnment 
subsidy programs are d continuous phenomenon nowadays and 
many farmerG pldn their enterprises around them . 
The edu~dtional background ot farmers al~o comes under 
this category; bv th f ormally and 1rom the ~tandpoint of 
experience . It is logical to assume thct a young abpiring 
farmer will be inclined to foll ow in his father ' s fcctstepb 
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and engage in the type of tarming where his experience would 
be most beneficial. 
Another factor whi ch may or may not be worth considering 
concerns the prestige associated with certain types of farming . 
Fattening beef cattle seems t o capture the imagination of 
farmers more than swine or cow-calf operat ions . Perhaps the 
nature of the risk involved and the possibilities of makin9 a 
large profit in a good year make fattening beef cattle more 
glamorous . Even after oad years, the adage that it's best to 
"get some hair off the back of the dog that bit you'' seems 
to be reason enough to keep farmers coming back for more . 
In the first part of this chapter we set out the variables 
which we planned to use in our regression analysis . In the 
second part we listed a number of variables which will not be 
tested but are important in determining farm enterprises . 
Most of the latter variables are extremely dif fi~ult to use 
in any sort of empirical analysis, particularly those in the 
institutional category . In the next chapter we will test 
those variables on which we have collected data by using the 
familiar regression techniques . 
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V. REGHE.S~ION ANALY~ES 
In the first model in this chapter, four regression 
equations, '"'l' ,.12 , :.i3 , and ti.4 , are used to measure the 
variation in neef-c cw numbers and intensity of r ow- cropping 
that can be explained by changes in the real and personal 
property taxes. The sec~nd part will use a number of regres -
sion equations to measure the relative significance of the 
independent variables in order to construct a model showing 
the most dominant variables. A word of caution is i n order 
when analyzing the models. ln farm enterprise selection, 
the isolating uf relevant decision making variables is ri sk y 
business. And to attribute predictive relatiunships to these 
variables as they may influence types ot farm enterprises i s 
equally risky. The parametrjc values of the data we have 
collected must be placed in proper perspective. Tests of 
the regression coefficients are useful only f or determining 
whether or not the variables have an effect that is signifi -
cantly different from zero . And when evaluating the vari aoles 
in each regressi on it must be kept in mind that there are 
many variables not included . 
The value of the models t o foll ow will not rest, 
therefore, on estimating specific coefficients for the 
independent decision making variables but rather in explain-
ing variation that occurs in farm enterprises. Snedecor 
(26) also emphasizes that unless the multiple R2 is at least 
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. 80, regres&ions should not be used for predictive purposes . 
A. ~odel I 
To test the hypothesis that an increase in the tax per 
head will cause a reduction in the number of beef cows per 
acre, we will use the following regression with two variables: 
Dependent x1 : beef cows per acre 
Independent x1 ~1 tax per head on cows 
M1 : x1 = - . 001118 + . 009322 x1 ~ 
t 4 . 0673 ** df = 97 
F ~ 16 . 544 ** df 1 , 97 
rt - . 3817 ** df - 97 
In testing the null hypothesis that the parameter b is 
equal to zero, we must reject it at the . 001 level . This tells 
us that if , in fact, the population parameter is zero, then 
the sample we got was a l in 1 , 000 chance . vr stated another 
way , we are 99.9% sure that this parameter is unequal to zero 
and positive . Likewise , the correlation coefficient (k= . 3817) 
is also significant at the l percent level {for tests of 
significance see 26, p . 46, 174, 246) . 
Using only this regression equation would lead us to 
reject the hypothesis that increases in the personal property 
tax on cows will cause a shift in resour~e alloLation from 
beef cows to other enterprises . And adding more variables 
and making the same test does not change the sign of the 
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personal property tax variable as is evident from the following 
equation using the variable&: 
Dependent x1s beef cows per acre 
Independent x3 s corn yield per acre 
x
8
1 real estate taxes per acre 
x15a tax per head for cows 
x16a soybean yield per acre 
M
2
1 x1 = -.03379 + .000018 x3 • .01049 X8 + .01155 x15 
+ .00211 x16 
t3 = .1~27 
tl~ a +7.3710** 
F = 42.5** 
R = .802** 
t 8 ; -9.9332** 
t16 = +~.7907*'* 
In this equation all regression coefficients but b3 are 
highly 1i9nificant . Adding the real estate tax and the corn 
and soybean yields actually reinforces the positive correla-
tion between the tax on beef cows and the number of head per 
county. 
We now have further support for the rejection of our 
hypothesis but we must not abandon completely the theory that 
taxing one asset against another will cause a money flight 
out of the taxed asset . Perhaps there are overriding effects 
working in the opposit• direction that tend to overcompensate 
for the downward shift in cow numbers. We know for example 
that the coat of operating the local governments is relatively 
uniform for all counties in the state. The salaries for 
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county officials, road maintenance and school expenses tend 
to stay nearly the same for every county. But some counties , 
particularly those in southern Iowa, do not have the high 
quality of farm land found in central Iowa and consequently 
the tax base is not aa high. Since counties with low land 
value per acre must raise nearly the same revenue as the 
counties with high land values per acre, if given a smaller 
tax base, they have no recourse but to levy a higher mill 
rate. The regression perhaps explains that the high land 
quality counties where sufficient revenue can be raised with 
a low mill levy are also the counties with the small numbers 
of beef cows per acre and the low land quality counties where 
the mill rate must necessarily be high have larger numbers 
of beef cows per acre. It might be said that the mill rate 
is independent of the quality of a county in terms of soil 
since the tax base can be varied by altering the assessed 
value . But this is only partly true and a small amount of 
arithmetic will prove that, although the variation in assess-
ment to market value ratios differ considerably, the mill rate 
must adjust even more. 
Suppose for example that an average acre of land in Story 
County is worth $400 on the market while an average acre in 
Monroe County is worth $100. Let us also assume that the costs 
of local government are the same in both counties. rom data 
on the ratio of assessed to market values for counties in 
Iowa we find the top value at 35 percent and the bottom at 20 
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percent . If we apply the 35 percent to ~onroe ~ounty we get 
a tax base for one acre of $35. Applying the 20 percent 
ratio to Story County we get a tax base of $80 per acre. 
Therefore, to raise equivalent revenue from one acre , the 
mil l rate in Monroe County would have to be over 200 percent 
greater. Obviously, statistics do not indicate this great a 
variation but the example illustrates the need for higher 
mill rates in the low land quality counties . 
Us i ng the land intensity variable as an indicator of 
farmer reaction to changes in taxes we u&e the following 
variables: 
Dependent x9 : total row crops as a percent of farm land 
Independent x3: corn yield per acre 
x8 : real estate taxes per acre 
x15s tax per head on beef cows 
x16 : soybean yield per acre 
M3 : x9 a .50615 - .0076 x3 + .09935 x8 - .10607 x15 
- . 00195 x16 
t3 ~ - .7373 
t1~ = -7.9318** 
F = 53 . 6321** 
R m . 8339** 
t 8 = + 11.01s1•* 
tl6 = - .6253 
In this model we use the same &et of independent variables 
as in model N.2 except that for every coefficient the sign& 
are reversed . We should reason from this that the correlation 
between dependent variables x1 and x9 is negative . Our 
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correlation matrix supports this deduction. It is also 
interesting to observe the lack of significance the yields 
per acre of the row crops have in explaining variation in the 
intensity variable. The corn yield la significant only at the 
~O percent level. Soybeans seem to explain les~ of the 
variation than corn does. A relatively high multiple R 
indicates that a good part of the variation from regression 
is explained by the variables used. It must be kept in mind 
however that the value of R is not an especially good indicator 
of the worth of a re9rea11on equation. As Snedecor (26, 
p. 438) points out, the value of R will never decrease if we 
keep adding new variables. The change in R may be slight 
but further increases in the number of variables will only 
increase the value of R. What we are more intere&ted in is 
consistency in the signs of our regression coefficients and 
the independence of our independent variables. 
In model ~2 and ~ 3 we found a highly significant variable 
in ><a (tax cost per acre of real estate). ttlso, we find the 
signs reversed in both instances which indicate& consistency 
within the as&umptions we made regarding mill rates, the tax 
base and the cost of government. Perhaps some explanation is 
in order. The simple correlation coefficient oetween the 
ratio of assessed to market values, x6 , and the ratio of 
intensity, x9 , is negative and highly 6igni!icant. With 
r 6 , 9 = -. 6980 this tells ua that if the correlation is 
actually zero, the probability of getting a sample ttrH this 
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size is . 01 . This means, as&uming that intensity is a 
reasonable measure of land value, that a~ land value goes up 
the ratio of assessed value to market value decreases. This 
is nothing new to students of the real property tax. When we 
compare variable x6 to x8 we also find a highly significant 
negative correlation (r6 , 8 = -.5539) . As the ratio of 
assessed to market values increases, the tax per acre 
decreases . Accounting for this, a& previously pointed out , 
is that in counties where the market value of land is low the 
ratio of a&sessed to market value is high. Also the mill 
rate is high , but the dlfferenGe in assessed value between 
the highest valued and the lowest valued counties 1& so great 
that in spite of a higher mill rate in the low tax ba&e 
counties, the tax revenue per acre will be less . It follows 
from t his that the correlation between th• tax bill , Xa, and 
land quality, x9 , will be positive and highly $19nificant 
{r8 , 9 ~ . 6990) . Also, the high negative correlation between 
x1 and x9 seems to be part of the reason for a high negative 
correlation oetween x1 and x8 i 
M4 i x1 = . 06095 - .00859 x t "" - 6 . 79~6** 8 R .5679** = + 
F = 46 . 1814** 
In summary, the four regression& tested indicate that 
(l) the beef cow variable is not directly reduced by higher 
personal property (2) that thia reversal can probably be 
adequat ely explained in terms of other land quality and tax 
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characteristics; and (3) that the livtstock variable and the 
real estate tax variable operate in the direction we hypoth-
esized but for different reasons . The tax on real estate is 
a function of the land 4uality and the number of cows per 
acre is also a function of land quality which gives the two 
variables, real estate taxes and beef cow numbers , a consist-
ent relationship but does not necessarily prove that beef LOW 
numbers are a function of the real estate tax. 
B. ~~del II 
In model II , the regressions are intended to compare the 
relative significance of the empirical data we have selected 
to explain the variation in beef cow numbers. Once again we 
must evaluate the tested variables with the knowledge t hat many 
other variables are omitted. Starting with the largest number 
of independent variables, we naturally get the large&t multiple 
correlation coeffi cient. Cur problem is to cast off the 
irrelevant variables and add certain new ones in order to get 
a more meaningful model and still not sacrifice too much in 
terms of goodne&s of fit: 
Dependent x1 : beef cows per acre 
Independent 3: 
9: 
15: 
16: 
17: 
18: 
corn yield per acre 
total row crops as a percent of farm land 
tax per head on beef cows 
soybean yield per acre 
percent of tenancy 
percent of buildings to land and 
buildings 
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ff·~: Variable (X) b value t value (Probability of a 
(interc.ept) greater value) 
Dependent 1 +.02599 
Independent 3 -.000084 - . 8348 (. 50) 
9 -.094217 -6.6555 ! .01 l 15 +.002698 +l. 7542 .10 
16 +.001602 +4 . 7046 .01 
17 +.000028 + .1886 
18 - . 000452 - 3. 3443 ( . 01) 
h = +. 858** r = 42.79** 
From this model we find that two of the variables, corn 
yield and tenancy, do not appear to be significant when 
combined with the other variables in this model. However, 
before throwing them out, they were checked out with a smaller 
model, M6 , below: 
M6: Variable b value t value (Probability of a 
greater value) 
Uependent xl +.032693 2. 9934 
X3 +.000206 +2 . 2102 ( • O!:>) 
X9 -. 125135 -7.9874 ( . 01) 
Xl5 + . 001558 + .866 (. 40) 
Xl7 +.004426 +2.9025 (. 01) 
R = +.790** F = 39.00** 
After looking at these two models, certain points of 
interest come out . In the first place it becomes obvious 
that x9 , which measures the ratio of row crops to total farm 
land, is the most significant variable. This was to be 
expected since we reasoned that beef cows would not be as 
plentiful in areas where the land resourc.e was used more 
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intensely . On this basis, the large negative regression 
coefficient was anticipated . It is also evident that our 
variable of interest, x15, is not carrying much weight. We 
find also that x3 and xl7 take up some of the slack from having 
dropped Xl8 and X16 · Nevertheless the fit on M6 is not as 
good as the fit on M5 as indicated by the reduction in the 
value of R. 
On the basis of ~ priori economic reasoning, it would 
appear that x17 (tenancy) would tend to have less effect upon 
enterprise selections than such things as corn and soybean 
yields and the intensity ratio . Therefore, x17 was replaced 
by x16 and the following regression r un: 
M7 : Variable b value t value (Probability of a 
greater value) 
Dependent l +.008205 + . 7472 
Independent 3 - • 000134 - 1. 2630 ( . 40) 
9 -. 084774 -1l.5270 1.01) 
15 +. 002433 + 1 . 5017 . 20~ 
16 +. 001944 + 5.7750 .01 
R = + . 835** F = 54. 2** 
In this model, we see that perhaps soybean yield, x16 , 
takes up some of the significance of corn yield . Al so we 
see a second shift in the sign of the x3 coefficient . This 
would lead us to wonder about the nature of the effect of 
this variable . ~e note also that x15 picks up slightly . The 
high significance of x16 is not easy to j ustify economi~ally. 
This variable is not particularly highly correlated with any 
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of the others . Nevertheless , in each regres&ion where this 
variable was used its regression coefficient proved to be 
greater than zero at the l percent level of significance. It 
is not always wise to include in the model a variable that 
cannot be justified on an A oriori economic basis, but further 
research into possible reasons for the power of soybean yields 
discloses that in the state of Iowa there is not a parti cular -
ly high correlation between land quality and soybean yields . 
A look at the data tells us that in north central and north -
east Iowa where beef cow numbers are well below the average , 
the yields per acre of soybeans in these two sections of the 
state are also oelow the state average for all counties but 
three ( see Appendix c) . Of the 20 counties in south central 
and southwest Iowa, 12 are above the stute average in soybean 
production while 17 of the 20 are above the state average in 
stock cow numbers. In general, the northern half of the state 
does not have the same edge in soybean yields that it enjoys 
in corn yields; but in southern Iowa, and particularly in 
southwest Iowa, every one of the 10 counties is above the 
state average . The level of soybean yields , therefore, does 
not indicate that the land is of particularly high quality 
as in the case of corn yields . This does not mean, however, 
that soybean acreage should be excluded from variable x
9 
since 
the important factor in variable x9 i~ row crop acres and 
soybeans and corn are by far the most important row crops in 
Iowa. 
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For the next model we add the real estate tax variable 
to model M
7 
so that we can look at it in combination with the 
previous regression: 
M : 8 Variabl e b value 
t value (Probability of a 
greater val ue) 
Dependent l -. 004495 - . 4061 
Independent 3 -. 000025 - • 2414 
8 - . 004740 - 3 . 3920 (. 01~ 
9 -. 057887 - 5 . 4825 (.Ol 
15 +. 005405 +3 . 0559 ~ . 01 ~ 
16 +.002000 +6 . 259 . 01 
k = +. 85!>** F = +50 . 52** 
The inclusion of x8 does not make a very large difference 
in the multiple correlation coefficient . The real and 
personal property tax variables are both highly &ignificant 
in this regression , but relative to the intensity variable , 
x9 , they do not explain much of the variation in beef-cow 
numbers . When the tax variables are included separately they 
do not show very high significance, but when used together 
each shows high significance . In addition , x3 once again shows 
a lack of significance which seems to be convincing evidence 
for excluding it from the final model . 
In the final model , ~8 was changed to exclude both corn 
yield , x3 , and real estate taxes, x8 , and include the building 
ratio , xl8 : 
t • • ''9 . Variable b value 
Dependent l +. 026137 
Independent 9 -. 093529 
15 +.002579 
16 +. 001440 
18 -. 000475 
R = +. 857** 
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t value 
+ 2 . 2899 
- 13 . 5427 
+ l. 7005 
+~ . 7101 
- 3 . 8340 
(Probability of a 
greater value) 
( . 01 l ( . 10 
~ . 01 
. 01) 
F = 64 . 86** 
We see by the R and F values of this regre$sion that the 
substitution of x18 for X~ and x8 slightly improved the 
regre&sion . Comparing this wi th our first regression in this 
model , M5 , we see only a .001 reduction in the multiple 
correlation coefficient but a much larger f value and we have 
r educed the number of independent varidbles by two. A desir-
abl e charact eristic of M9 is the lack of interdependence 
between the independent variables. The highest s imple correla -
tion coefficient is r 9 , 15 = -. 491 . From an ecomonic stand-
point there also appears to be little reason for expecting a 
great deal oi in~erdependence between the5e variables . 
Suppose we subtract some variables from this regression 
and obser ve the effect . Taking away x16 and x16 will leave 
onl y x9 and our variable of interest , x15 • We get the 
following : 
MlO: Variable b value t value (Probability of 
greater value) 
a 
Dependent l + . 056486 +6 . 1176 
Independent 9 -. 080047 - 9.504 1 ( • 01) 
l~ +. 000458 + . 2431 
R = . 7482** f = 61 . 05** 
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~ e see that b) taking away x16 and x18 we get a sizeable 
drop in the multiple correlation coefficient. The significance 
of the r egress ion does not change substantially as indicated 
by F. It ls also obvious that when paired with x9 alone , x15 
does not prove significant. In other words, in this regression 
we cannot say with any degree of assurance that the regression 
coefficient for x15 is different from zero . When the regress i on 
is run using only x9 as an independent variable the multiple 
regression coefficient is still r 1 , 9 = +. 7480. The point is , 
the variable x9 when used alone with x1S apparently neutralizes 
the variation accounted for by X15 · 
From an ~ priori economic point of view , the variable 
X9 , meas uring the ratio of row crops to total land in farms , 
i s a peculiar variable . Un the one hand it appears to be a 
good indicator of a farmer ' s behavior in reaction to changes 
in his income . un the other hand it appears to be a good 
indicator of land production capability, and for this reason 
is useful in explaining variation in beef cow numbers . It 
fits on either side of the equation and perhaps this should 
be sufficient justification for omitting it altogether . 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
From the time of its inception in 1830, the Iowa property 
tax has continued to decline in relative importance . There 
has not been a great change, however, in the ratio of per&onal 
to real property tax revenue . Personal property tax revenue 
has ordinarily accounted for around 14-20 percent of total 
property tax revenue. In spite of a decline relative to 
other forms of revenue, the total amount collected annually 
from property tax levies has steadily increased . This is the 
result of a greeter demand for public services at all levels 
of government . Not only have the federal and state govern -
ments assumed greater fiscal responsibilities but local 
governments, which receive a major proportion of their funds 
from property taxes , have also increased their expenditures . 
In Iowa a substantial percent of the property tax 
revenue comes from the agricultural sector . The Iowa farmer 
is not in a very good position to shift property taxes either 
forward to the consumer or backward to the soller of farm 
inputs . The characteristics of the demand for farm products 
do not permit a farmer to roise the selling price of his 
output independently of other farmers . The incjdence of a 
tax on land or on beef cows will generally fall upon the owner 
of the as set. There is not much evidence that land owners, 
when a change in taxes is imposed, will have to bear the full 
burden of capitali1ation because land values have not 
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decreased commensurate with tax increases. The trend has 
been toward higher rather than lower land values in the face 
of increasing taxes . 
The intensity of labor input as taxes change will 
depend upon each farmer ' s reaction to c.hanges in income . 
Taxes such as the real estate levy which reduces a farmer ' s 
income by a fixed amount will probably impel him to work 
harder to regain his lost income . On the other hand, the 
imposition of a tax upon a farmer ' s income will not always 
produce a unif orm effort t o increase the labor input . The 
substitution effect of a tax on additional increments of 
income , that induce a farmer to desire more leisure , may out-
weigh the desire to work harder in order to regain lost 
income. In this respect , there is no techni4ue for anticipat-
ing the behavior of individual farmers . 
The degree of risk a farmer is willing to assume is also 
determined by his particular aversion to risk . Each farmer 
will have his own marginal disutility of risk and marginal 
utility of income and the enterprise he selects ~il l reflect 
this . Assuming decreasing marginal utility of income and 
increasing marginal disutility or risk , a higher tax per head 
on beef cows would lower the net income from cows and encourage 
a shift into higher risk enterprises . However, the empirical 
tests do not bear this out . 
Using empirical data to explain variations in farm 
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enterprises can produce some vague results . For purposes of 
regression analyse&, there are no obvious measures of the 
intensity of land use which can be used to categorize farm 
enterprises . To serve this purpose we used as dependent 
variables two measures, the number of beef cows per acre and 
the ratio of row crops to total farm land in each county . 
The latter of these variables was al~o used as a measure of 
land ~uality and included as an independent variable in the 
regressions on beef cow numbers . As expected , the tests 
attributed a great deal of the variation in beef cow numbers 
to the quality of the land . In addition to land quality a 
number of other explanatory variables were included . rarm 
size , the level of personal and real property taxes, the rat i o 
of the value of buildings to land and buildings, and the 
percent of farm tenancy were all included . 1~one of these , 
including the variables of interest- -property tax levels , were 
particularly good indicators of the type of farm enterprise 
selected as measured by beef cow numbers . In other words , 
the regression analyses do not support the hypothesis that 
high per5onal property taxes are an obstacle to the transition 
of resources into beef cow production . 
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IX. APPENDIX A 
The first step toward arriving at the final millage levy 
for each taxing district is to determine the revenue require-
ments for each of the four major local government functions , 
school funds, county road maintenance, city and town funds and 
the county general fund . Of these four categories, the 
general fund is the only one in which the tax bill is spread 
uniformly over all property in the county both rural and urban . 
Within the general fund, certain appropriations, such 
as the auditor's fu11d, must be raised with a mill rate that 
is limited by state statutes. Assuming that these mill rates 
are as high as they can go within the limits of the state 
laws, in order to increase the revenue for such funds the tax 
base must be enlarged by raising assessed property values 
over the entire county. For example, if the state limits 
the mill rate for the auditor's fund at 2 mills and the 
auditor need$ £4000 on which to operate, the tax base would 
have to be at least s2,ooo,ooo ($4000/ .002 = ~2 ,000,000) . 
From this it is apparent that the county assessor must 
keep in the back of his mind the needs of the county general 
fund each time he assesses property in his county . Part of 
the fluctuations that arise in the county general fund are 
explained by the fluctuation~ in the tax base . 
Does this mean that the different revenue requirements 
that arise among school districts are raised by varying the 
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assessment level or the tax base within each school district? 
The answer is no . ~chool revenues are determined by using 
the tax base that is settled upon for purposes of the general 
fund and the necessary mill rate for each school district is 
determined by dividing the needed revenue for the school in 
that district by the total assessed value of all property 
within the school district . This quotient (or millage) is 
then added to the millage f or the general fund . 
The mill rate for raising urban funds and the mill rate 
for county roads are determined in the same manner used in 
calculating the rate for school districts . These levies are 
also added to the school and general fund levies to determine 
the total millage for each taxing distri ct . It must be kept 
in mind , however, that the revenue for county roads is raised 
from the rural district~ only and the revenues for urban areas 
is raised within the corporate limits of the city or town. 
To summarize by illustration, a typical rural tax 
district would be required to contribute revenue for the 
county general fund and the county road fund. The rates for 
each being uniform throughout the county. In addition, each 
rural district would have a unique school levy and the 
different school mill rates account, in large part, for the 
variation in taxes that exi&t between school districts . Like-
wise , an urban district would be responsible for the general 
fund, its unique school levy and the urban taxes . 
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The assessor ' s main problem therefore is to (1) give 
consideration to all £actors that determine the value of 
property and (2) bear in mind the county revenue needs when 
arriving at the actual value of property . ~hen the actual 
value is determined for personal property, he then takes 
60 percent of this to arrive at the asses sed value. In 
practice , the actual value does not represent what the property 
would bring if put up tor public auction but it too is a per-
cent of the market or sale value . For example , the actual 
value of cows 3 years old and over as li sted in the 1964 
Iowa Personal Property Price Guide (l4 b ) is $90 and assessed 
value therefore is $54 . Obviously, the market value of most 
cows is well above $90 but this figure has been calculated to 
raise sufficient revenue and apparently it is not considered 
out of line when compared to other assessed property . 
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X. APPENDIX 8 
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Table 10 . Correlation matrix 
Variable l 2 3 4 6 
1 +l . 0000 
2 .. . 3669 +l.0000 
3 -. 0927 - . 2040 +l.0000 
4 -. 6470 -. 4327 +. 4920 +l.0000 
5 +. 0790 -. 0825 -. 1762 -. 0112 +l . 0000 
6 +.4822 +. 1888 -.3137 - .6632 +. 1950 +l . 0000 
7 + . ~328 +. 7763 - . 3294 - . 7074 +. 0705 +. 6754 
8 -. 5679 -. 0631 +. 4710 +. 7754 -. 3551 - . 5539 
9 - .7480 -. 4895 +. 3417 +. 9243 +. 0662 -. 6980 
15 +. 3817 +. 9926 -. 2102 -.4318 -. 0774 +. 1879 
16 + . 1463 - . 2709 +. 6612 +. 4514 -. 0371 -. 2111 
17 -. 5816 -. 5083 + . 3815 +. 8687 +. 2277 - . ~52 
18 +. 0012 +. 2574 -. 1727 -. 3259 -. 4976 +. 0655 
\ 
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Table 10 . (Conti nued ) 
Vari -
able 7 8 9 15 16 17 18 
7 +l. 0000 
8 -. 3975 +l. 0000 
9 -.7464 +. 6990 +l. 0000 
15 +.7803 - . 0656 -.4912 +l. 0000 
16 - .3538 +. 3107 +. 2630 -. 2764 +l. 0000 
17 -. 6666 + . 5967 +. 8982 -. 5058 +. 3970 +l. 0000 
18 +.1707 +. 0389 - . 3558 +. 2516 -. 3231 -.49~9 +l. 0000 
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XI. APPENDIX C 
Variables 
1 . Number of stock cows per acre 
2 . Mill rate for county rural distritts 
3 . Average corn 7ield 
4 . Cash value output per acre 
(corn produced ( 1) + s oybeans produce& ($2 , 15)) 
Total acres in farm land 
5 . Average farm size 
6 . Ra tio of assessed value to market value per acre of land 
and buildings 
7 . Taxes per acre as a percent of market value per acre 
8 . Real estate tax bill per acre 
9 . Row crops as a percent of total acres in farm land 
(intensity) 
15 . Tax bill per cow in dollars 
16 . Average soybean yield 
17 . Percent of tenancy on farms 
18 . Percent of buildings to land and buildings (a s s~ssed 
values) 
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T&l>l• 11. Coaat)' data 
xl Xi x, X4 x, x6 
!er 
(100 Aeru) (lCilla) (ltaaheb) (Dollar•) (.Acr•) ('l) 
BordrwMt 
loeD& Viata l.S 61.722 77.9 37 . 18 199 2, 
Cb•rokM 1. 7 5.5.201 81.6 34.4.5 223 24 
Clay 1.7 .5,.147 75.4 34. 66 229 22 
Dt.ck.luoa 2.0 65.707 63.2 27.89 235 26 
lmet 1.6 60.610 71.2 36.12 320 25 
Lycm 1.6 55 .494 68.1 29.47 214 23 
O'BrieD 1.0 51.923 77.1 39.59 204 n 
Oaceola 1.1 56.481 70.3 34. 10 2U 21 
Palo Alto 1.3 63.1" 69.0 35 • .52 277 28 
'1,..ath 2.1 48.720 74.4 30.49 211 26 
~Olltu 1.4 54.16' 76 . 2. 40.35 219 n 
liou:a .6 Sl .630 79.S 37.84 185 22 
lonla Central 
tln 1.8 64.979 74 • .5 30 .62 187 24 
Cerro Gordo 2.0 63.0t.1 73 • .5 31.06 201 21 
Ployd 1. 9 70.645 77.4 31 .72 189 29 
Jranklia 1.7 50. 060 70.1 37.67 198 21 
Bucock 1.7 62 .246 69.1 32.24 206 20 
llumbolt 1.1 60.670 81.9 42.19 217 23 
C.autb 1.5 53.877 74.1 37.38 217 21 
Mitchell 1.2 59.649 12.0 29.24 200 23 
Vimlebaao 1.3 68.099 73. 9 32.52 176 21 
Worth 1. 7 69. 304 68.S 28. 67 192 20 
Vrlpt 1.2 51.671 11 .s 40.83 210 22 
llortheut 
AllaMU. 3.5 62.161 71.2 9.26 214 32 
Black llawk 1.4 66.580 83.1 31. 94 170 23 
Br r . 6 73.675 71.3 23.69 150 27 
llllchanan 1. 7 70.553 10.1 23.36 169 24 
Cbiekuaw 2. 2 62 .153 64.J 20 .64 176 28 
Claycoa z.o 71.170 62.8 11. 59 183 32 
Delaware 1.2 61.466 71 .2 21.40 171 30 
Dubuque 2.4 40. 020 7, •• 16.42 181 32 
rayett• 1.6 60.610 71. 2 36.U 310 2.5 
lloRrd 2.5 66.,,, 54.8 17 .01 195 16 
Wimuhiek 2.7 66.650 62. 2 12.79 174 30 
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Table 11. (Continued) 
Xi X4 x, x, 
Per 
(too Acr .. ) (Mill•) (Bu9h•l8) (Dollar•) (M:ru) (t.) 
We•t Central 
Audubon 2. 8 69.404 81.8 24.88 191 28 
Calhoun 2.2 .56.598 81.8 42.86 218 21 
Carroll 3.0 42.435 83.7 9.S8 194 22 
Crawford 3.2 63.810 79.0 2.3.12 214 28 
GrMM 2.1 58.864 83.3 42.78 239 25 
Cutbd.• 4.2 75.497 77.2 21.98 208 27 
Barria on 1.9 72.162 79.7 28.18 228 28 
Ida 2.4 63.271 83.7 31.31 211 26 
Hoaoa.a 1.4 73.235 68.5 25.30 276 29 
Sac 2.6 56.810 80.l 34.24 214 25 
helby 2.6 54.258 83.7 29.15 204 26 
Woodbury 1.7 73.389 68.3 24.25 202 31 
Casatral 
loona 1.2 59.257 85.8 38.82 183 25 
Dall•• 1 • .5 60.134 83.4 35.20 202 24 
erumy 2.4 56.50, 86.9 40.61 193 24 
Baailtoo 1 . 0 61.502 11.6 44.10 195 23 
Bardin 2.0 61.185 84.2 37.54 188 24 
Ju per J.S 68.577 81.0 27.94 194 21 
Marahall 3.S 61.943 86.) 34.07 191 24 
Polk 1.9 92.047 11.4 34.19 164 21 
1cNuhtek 4.9 68.030 85.2 27.32 199 27 
Story 1.4 71.456 84.2 40.76 192 23 
Tllm 4.0 .55.488 86.l 29.06 19.5 24 
Vebeter 1.8 67.472 81.S 41.80 209 21 
lut c.nc.-al 
Batoa 3.6 62.l'O 88.2 32.63 206 23 
Cedar 3.3 64 • .587 91.8 34.28 181 25 
Clinton 2.2 67.560 89.5 '3.22 176 21 
I ova s.2 62.549 81.6 23.4) 201 2S 
Jacuou 4.5 69.617 ao.1 lS.54 206 27 
Jobmoa 4.1 75.,37 81.1 24.98 172 22 
Jonu 2.7 73.617 84.2 23.77 18.5 2.5 
L11111 2.6 75.996 7.5.5 24.93 145 26 
Muautln.e 2.7 66.529 12.2 28.39 188 21 
lcott 2.3 69.1.51 79.1 37.00 147 21 
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Table 11. ( Conti d) 
Xl X2 x, X4 Xs 
Per 
(100 Acru) (Milla) (aushela) (Dollars) (Ac:r .. ) (1) 
louthwat 
Adair S.8 69.102 74.6 18.91 214 31 
Adam s.2 63.952 73.6 17.74 221 36 
CU a 4.3 62.206 81.8 24.36 209 31 
Fremont 2.2 67.338 73.6 31 .. 86 267 28 
Mill• 1.9 59.92.5 76.9 Jl.96 253 26 
Moat&GMfY 3.2 56.499 79.7 26.64 217 28 , .. s.s 60.908 71.3 %3.49 212 32 
Pottawtcaaf.• 1.8 62.U7 80.C 30.Cl 204 26 
Taylor s.1 67.432 64.8 14.41 207 33 
South Central 
Appaa.oot1• 4.7 74.981 61.4 11.40 204 28 
Clarke S.4 78.731 61.3 11.14 235 30 
Decatur 4.6 71.665 54 • .5 I.SS 244 35 
Luc:aa 4.6 80.114 61.l 10.37 224 30 
Madhou s.s 66.753 · n .e 18.81 214 27 
Marion 3.1 72.010 75.1 19.~6 185 29 
Monroe 4.S 75.030 S1.5 8.76 228 31 
ainggol4 4.9 87.S64 85.2 10.42 262 27 
Ullicm '·' 67.038 6S.7 14.08 223 28 Wan•n 3.9 89.031 71.S 19.03 201 24 
Wayne s.o 68.956 S7.7 12.13 246 27 
lou.tbee•t 
Davi• 3.7 80.49.5 66.3 11.12 209 27 
De• HoiDU 3.5 11.110 90.S 32.68 167 24 
Hanry 3.Z 73.886 79.S 27.27 118 22 
Jeff eraon 3.3 66.244 69.2 19.91 186 26 
Kao uk 3.3 63.1'0 76.1 24.74 188 29 
Lee 2.7 74.557 77.9 20.31 178 22 
Loula• 2.9 75.453 78.6 ,0.42 224 22 
Mahaaka 2.1 57.102 81.6 29.62 167 27 
Van Buren 3.9 83.191 74.S 14.67 211 27 
Wa llo 3.2 82.91.5 69.7 18.57 149 27 
Wuhiqtoa 2 • .5 63.639 80.1 ~0.07 191 26 
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'fable 11. (Collttmaed) 
x, ~ X4 Z5 .. 
(too una) OUll•) ( ... be1-) (Doll.an) (Aor•) ~) 
r x, 270.517 6500.944 7433.5 26 .958 10045 2.544 
-x 2.73 75 26.94 202.,5 25.7 
I 1.3 '·' 9.48 19.7 3.'8 o•! 
I 
.,o .13 .33 .15 .14 
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Tabl e 11. ~etlawa4 ) 
X7 '8 X9 X15 X16 Xi1 '1• 
(1.) (Dollar•) (I) (Dollu•) (Buehal•) (I) (1) 
•ort'bw8t 
.._ Vi•t.a . 014 4.57 S3 3 .54 28.1 '' 12 Cherokee . 013 3.94 47 3.16 30.3 35 28 
Clay .ou 3 . 93 Sl J.24 28.l 61 14 
Die Id.Moo .014 3.16 38 3.94 2S .8 62 23 
lmat .01.5 4.50 56 3.46 27.0 65 21 
L10ll . 012 J.76 47 3.16 26.1 63 15 
G'lriea .ou 4.03 56 2.98 29.0 67 17 
Oaceola .013 3.13 54 3.22 15 . l 66 %1 
blo Alto .016 4.49 56 3.64 26.9 se 13 
•1,..outb .012 3. 35 43 2.79 29 .7 SS 17 
hc•hoetaa .013 4 . 24 60 J.10 26 .S 68 15 
Sioa .012 4.18 52 J.06 29 .7 63 20 
Wcrrda C:.etl'al 
Blatter .016 4 .17 44 '·'' 26.2 '' 25 Ceno Cos4o .OlJ 4. lS 47 3.59 24.1 55 32 rte,• .020 5 .47 46 4.02 U .4 49 13 
h aeklin .013 4.30 52 3.3.5 26.6 ,, 26 
BaDcock .013 4.28 53 3.57 22.8 62 22 
a.bolt .013 4.6~ 58 3.41 21 .1 67 20 
&oeeutla .012 3.91 57 3.08 2'.7 64 18 
Hitchell .014 3.61 46 3.41 24.2 48 30 
ViDMDap .ou 4.63 49 3.88 25.0 54 " Worth .ou 4 .0I 49 3.95 21.2 ,2 28
W'rlahc .012 4.20 58 2.96 27.3 69 24 
•ortheut 
Allaaqe .Olt 2.21 u '·'' 22.4 26 37 lla~k .... .015 4.14 40 3. 56 30.6 50 29 
kmer .019 s .. 01 37 4.21 14 .2 38 38 
•ebaaa .011 4.0S 17 4.02 24.0 3.9 30 
Clltckuaw .016 3.S7 ,7 3.59 20 .1 '' 28 Claytoa .022 3.70 20 4.06 21 .4 S2 40 Delaware . 011 4.02 32 i • .51 12 .a 40 36 
hbuque . 011 2 .42 23 2 .28 26.1 26 34 r.,.tt• .ou 4 .30 56 3.46 21.0 65 21 
._rd . 016 3.14 36 3.81 19.1 39 S3 
Wi-ahlak .020 s.21 24 3.80 19. 6 31 29 
95 
Table 11. (Contim.Mtd ) 
~ Xa x, X15 X16 X17 X19 
(1.) (Dolt..n) (X) (Dollar•) (lub.eb) (I) (I) 
Wut C..tral 
Auduboe . 019 4.27 32 3.98 28.8 45 23 
calhoun .013 4.62 60 3.26 28.8 n. 17 
Carrell .010 3.10 4.5 2.42 30.J .56 23 
~ ... ford .018 3.77 30 3.66 28.S 51 21 
er .... .015 4.61 51 3.42 29.6 10 14 
c.tbrl• .019 ).72 31 4.30 27.8 44 20 
Barria• .019 3.47 38 4.13 27.2 53 26 
Ida .011 4.SO 40 3.63 29.9 60 13 ..... .020 3.81 41 4.21 21.7 '' 27 lac .Oll '·34 44 3.84 "·' 41 36 Shel bf .014 3.75 36 3.10 28.9 54 18 
Voodbm7 .021 4.40 39 4.19 21.1 45 17 
C•tral 
loau .OlS 4.85 50 3.38 30.0 60 21 
Dalla• .014 4.19 47 3.44 29.l 60 24 
Grululy .013 4.80 so 3.24 30.9 63 23 
lailton .015 ,.29 60 3 • .57 28.8 67 22 
Bndln .015 4.71 4& 3.49 29.0 60 23 
.ru,.r .016 3.96 36 3.91 29.8 S4 24 
Marau11 .015 4.61 42 3.56 30.5 61 20 
Polk .016 6.00 4t S.24 27.8 ,8 33 
r ... h1u .018 4.34 '4 3.88 31.6 52 26 
ltO'l'J .ou 5.40 53 4.09 29.1 66 20 
r.. .014 3.94 36 3.15 29.2 49 24 
w•~•r .ou 5.U 58 3.14 21.4 65 16 
laat Cntral 
lfttca .01.5 4.84 40 3.56 30.6 50 29 
Cedar .015 S.04 39 3.73 31.3 48 28 
Cliaton .011 4 . 35 39 3.88 28.2 50 32 
low .OlS J.53 31 l.64 27.2 40 32 
J'acuon .011 3.22 20 3.98 26.0 30 19 
Jolluon .016 4.82 32 4.07 30.1 37 31 ....... .019 4.31 30 4.23 11.0 42 30 
Li• .017 5.53 36 4.37 2.5.6 42 38 
!fbacatiae .014 4.11 ,. 3.80 24.9 41 30 
leott .013 S.34 44 3.84 "·' 41 36 
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Table 11. ( Coatimaed ) 
x, Xa x, xl, :116 X17 :118 
~) (Dollar•) (I) (Dollar•) (IU9h•b) (I) ('I) 
Soutbwut 
Maix .021 .S.43 27 4.16 28.4 44 22 ..... . 020 2.9.5 2S 3.62 30. 2 43 15 
cue .018 3.77 31 3.62 29.1 4.5 18 
... _t .011 3.80 45 3.8J 31.2 61 25 
!Ulla .014 3.S4 44 3.U 30.7 .58 24 
Kaatao-ry .014 3.38 3S 3.23 30.2 S4 36 ,. .. .011 3.68 '4 3.Sl 29.7 47 23 
foctawattai• .016 4.07 39 3.58 29 . 2 54 24 
'laylol' .022 3.14 23 3.90 27.3 38 20 
lo.th C.atral 
Ana-e .020 2.06 20 4.27 25.9 28 14 
Claru . 024 2.47 19 4.59 25.7 37 23 
n.c.to:r . 023 2.16 16 4.50 14.4 '' 23 r.uu. .023 2.ss 18 •• ,1 2'.1 so 25 
Maduoe .Ol.7 2.97 27 3.86 28.9 35 27 
Mart-. .022 3.79 29 4.13 27.3 41 23 
Maaroe .020 1.8.5 16 4.28 2.5.4 24 22 
li..aold .023 2.,8 19 .5.03 24.8 36 16 
U.i• .011 2.47 22 3.83 27.4 40 21 
Warr91 . 022 4.1' 30 5 .20 Z6.5 42 32 .,.,... .019 2.09 2% 3.94 25.2 so 22 
Souc-..t 
Davu .-021 2.28 19 4.66 24.6 27 24 
.,.. MoiM8 .016 4.68 40 4.39 30.1 43 26 
a.ry .016 4.30 37 4.25 28.7 40 18 
Jeff enoe .018 S.24 31 J .79 27.2 '' 2J l:eokuk .016 3.30 35 3.64 28.4 47 24 
i.. .017 l.Ol 29 4,26 26.0 28 24 
Lou.la• .016 4.16 43 4 .29 26.3 46 18 
11eia..1ca .014 3.62 38 3.26 30.3 46 is 
v .. 1ua .011 2.61 23 4 .18 2S.4 25 24 
w.,.110 .020 3.87 29 4.73 26.8 S3 34 
Wallt.qtoa .016 4.31 40 3.d4 31.2 49 28 
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Taitt.a 11. (Contlamcl ) 
X7 " Z15 Xi,, Xi.1 X11 
(I) (Doll.an) ('I) (J)ollan) (luhele) (I) 00 
2: K1 1.6ll 387.51 sa.2 172.tO 26e.3 41J2.6 2397.2 
• .0164 z S.91 31.6 ,.11 27.U .... 24.21 
• .0031 .8S6J .1196 ·''°' 2.97 12.597 6.16 
c ·I- .19 .22 .31 .14 .11 .26 .26 
I 
